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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. The Problem 
A. ~ £! Equity ~ Venture Capital 
1. ~ ~ .21 ~ Financi£g 
The problem of raising capital for the expan-
sion of small business or for the financing of new ventures 
has always been a great problem to the seeker of such funds. 
In recent years the magnitude of this task has been greatly 
increased. 
In capital markets there has been a trend to 
debt issues on the part of the large. well established cor-
porations. In 1950 there were 6.Z billions in new issues. 
Of t his amount on ly 28% were equity issues and of the 
equity issues only 800 million dollars were common stocks. * 
The debt issues of high grade corporations have 
been sold at yields which are but a small fraction higher 
than the yields on United States Government long-term secu-
ritie s . To the corpor ations w_hich are able to command this 
low interest rate for their bonds. the low co at of finan-
cing is a great advantage. 
But for the lese well established corporations 
and especially for the new corporations which cannot take 
advantage of the low interest rates. it presents a great 
problem. These companies must go against the trend and 
* 19. P• 12 
ll 
issue common stocks which are expensive to the issuing 
corporation and which are none too well received. 
2. !&! Problems of~ ealthj Investor 
At one time the wealthy investor was the source 
from which the equity and venture capital needs of the na-
tion were met . Today we find t h is investor largely forced 
out of this field due to the present tax laws. 
In order to lessen their already large tax bur-
den , this group has resorted to investment in the large 
class of tax-exempt securities of states and municipalities. 
The low yield on this class of securities is more than off-
set, in the eyes of the wealthy investor, by the advantages 
to be gained through the tax-exemption on this yield. 
3. Inherent Risk in New Ventures 
Moat new ventures fail. The reasons advanced for 
this high percentage of new business failures are many and 
varied. Inept management, improper financing or under fin-
ancing, and failure to analyze the need for the particular 
good or service which these new businesses intend to pur-
vey are among the reasons offered. 
That some of those which fail should not fail is 
quite evident. The task of selecting the new ventures which 
could succeed from the many which are started is a task be-
yond the powers of most investors. It is a task which calla 
for the best in investment brains and experience. 
The average investor, seeing the many ventures 
which start out, and comparing these with the few that sue-
12 
ceed, realizes that the field of venture capital is fraught 
with risk. This risk element seems overwhelming and the 
investor rather than attempting a choice and losing, ig-
nores venture enterprise and puts his funds in established 
companies with actively traded securities. 
4 . Small Investor ..!!'ears Venture Enterprise 
The fear of the small investor of losing his 
savings in ill-conceived and ill-chosen ventures is a 
real fear. Most of the small investors who have invest-
ed in such enterprises have lost and lost heavily . 
But it is from this small investor that the ven-
ture capital needs of the nation must be met. This group 
controls, "The large reservoir of the savings of the coun-
try, ••• holds a large part of the 76 million insurance 
policies, and makes up most of the 28 million investors 
in government bonds and the bulk of the savings bank depos-
itors."* 
This group represents what must be the money fountain 
from which will flow the capital nedessary to meet the ven-
ture capital needs of the nation. The problem of finding the 
mechanism t hrough which these funds can be invested with an 
assurance of adequate safety and return for the small inves -
tor is one of the main considerations of this paper. 
B. The Need !£.!: New l!'inancing 
*15 . P• 29 
1. Shortage Strikes ~ Heart 2f Capitalistic System 
The widespread ownership of shares in American 
business--the vesting of ownership in the hands of the in-
vesting public rather than under a central governmental 
authority--is the keystone of American capitalism. 
We. in this nation, have the many material com-
fo rts we en joy today because someone in the past had the 
vision and initiative to see the needs of the nation and 
to d evise the means of filling these needs. e cannot af-
ford to let t h is vision and initiative dry up . ~he need 
for new proa uc t s and new ideas. the need for continuing 
growth to ma intain our pr es ent high wor ld position is well 
recognized . 
2. ~ Hecognized 
New business ventures must be undertaken even 
though risky. "Risk-taking, even in wildcat ent erprise , 
is s o essent ial to u. s. prosperity that it would be de-
pressing indeeo to fino young men losing their appetite 
for it ."* 
At t he ti me of the founding of t he American ~e-
search and Development uorporation--a venture capita l en-
terpr is e--one of its founders said: 
The post war pr osperity of America depends in a 
large measure on finding financial support fo r 
t hat cornparati vel~y smal l pe r cent age of ne. ideas 
and developments which g ive promise of expanded 
production and employment and an increased stan-
dard of living fot the American people . We must 
* 20. p. 84 
14 
have a reasonably high birthrate of new under-
takings.* 
c. Mutual l!,unds .!! !! Solution 
1. Gainipg Acceptance amopg Small Investors 
A phenomenon of the past decade has been the 
rapid growth of the "open-end" or mutual investment com-
pany. In 1940 the entire mutual fund industry had a net 
** 
asset value of .5 billion dollars. There were 72 mutual 
fund a at this time. As of December 31. 1950, them were 
98 funds with an asset valuation of over 2.5 billion dol-
lara."'** 
A great portion of this increase has come from 
an increasing acceptance of the mutual funds among the 
ama 11 invest ore • 
2. Mutual Funds ~ ~ Investment Experience and ~ech-
nical Skill --- ----
Earlier in this chap~er it was stated that the 
small investor lacks the time to seek out worthy venture 
enterprise, but what is more important, he lacks the skill 
to pick the few successes from the many failures. The in-
vestment skill and experience which would be necessary in 
order to Sake a well considered choice in the venture cap-
ital field lies within the investment company field. 
* 26 0 -;.., . 
** ..,...,, 
*** 24. 
p. 38 
P• 722 
p. 7 
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Within the following pages some proposals will 
be brought forward which would attempt to bring this accu-
mulated skill and experience of the mutual funds to bear 
on the venture capital problem. Through these proposals 
it is hoped that the investible funds of the small invest-
ors through the medium of the "open-end" investment com-
pany could be placed in a few of these venture situations 
and result in ultimate gain for the small investor and 
for the economy as a whole. 
II. Plan of Thesis 
.A. ~ Investment Company 
1. Hiatorl 2£ Investment Company 
In order to fully evaluate the present poe i tion 
of the mutual funds. it is necessary to bring out some high• 
lights in the past history of the investment company field 
in general and of the past history of the mutual investment 
companies in particular. 
]Tom this analysis of the past. we can get an idea 
of the philospphy which guided the industry at the time of 
of ita past mistakes and greatest excesses and of the phil-
osophy which motivated the founding of the investment com-
panies. 
The past successes and failures of the industry 
give us the starting point which we can use to chart a 
course for the future participation of the mutual funds 
in the venture capital field. 
16 
17 
2. Legal Background £! Investment Companies 
From the mistakes and excesses of the past came 
the demand for the regulation of investment companies at 
the federal level, since the state regulation had proved 
ineffective. ~his demand was met in the Investment ~ompany 
Act of 1940. 
A summary of the more important provisions of 
the Act, with reference to the administration of the regu-
lations under the Securities and ~change ~ommisaion, will 
give potential investors some knowledge of the safeguards 
which have been set up to protect the investor in present-
day investment companies. 
3. Specific Proposals 
After presenting the mutual fund .- against the 
background of ita past history and after setting up the 
legal framework within which these funds operate, specific 
proposals as to the manner of partie ipatfon in the venture 
capital field can be enumerated. 
Among the ~oposals to be advanced and considered 
are the "super fund", the invea tment committee type of 
participation and the place of regional fUnds and industry 
type funds in the supply of venture capital. 
III. Work of Othera 
A. Problem §!! Interested Others 
1. Within ~ Industri 
Mr. William D. Carter of the Keystone Company of 
Boston, sponsors of the .Keystone Custodian .l!'unds, has 
written an illuminating article on the subject of mutual 
funds in the Harvard ~;Business Review. One of the prob-
lems he considers is the place of the mutual fund indus-
try in venture capital supply. 
J.'-. Arthur Wieaenberger, a dealer in investment 
company securities, presents a yearly compilation of use-
ful statistics concerning the mutual funds. This work 
makes no direct reference to the problem of venture capi-
tal, but it is very useful to the student of mutual funds 
since it contains much information on the subject of the 
mutual fund industry and on the individual funds. 
2. Buaineaa !E! Financial Preas 
The growing importance of the mutual funds in 
the field of finance is recogni2ed by the regular columna 
devoted to this subject in .Barrons and in the Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle. These publications contain up-to-
date statistics with regard to the many individual funds 
and are often the source of material on the many problems 
which have grown up around a vital and somewhat controver-
sial industry. 
Numerous articles concerning the mutual funds · 
have been included in other publications of a business or 
financial nature. 
3. EDpular Publications 
18 
Fublicatione which are more general in scope 
than the bueineaa and financial press have in the past car-
ried articles on the subject of mutual funds. ~heee artic-
les do not serve as a source of material for a paper such as 
this. ~ut they do serve to infoxm the public of the mutual 
funds and. as education of the public as to the merits of 
mutual funds is a task of much importance to these same 
funds. the popular articles are quite useful to the indus-
~~ 
19 
CHAPTER II 
I. European Histor¥ 
A. Beginning !a Continental Europe 
1. Societe Generale ~ Belgique 
The investment company, or as it is more gen-
erally known in ~urope, the investment trust, is usually 
acknowledged to bave ~ egun in Brussels, Belgium. In 
August, 1822, there was formed in that city, under the 
aegis of William II. King of the Netherlands, a company 
which was the forerunner of the present-day investment 
company. 
This precursor of today'a investment compan-
ies was known, after the separation of Belgium from the 
Netherlands, as the Societe Generale de Belgique. The 
Societe was formed for the purpose of facilitating in-
vestment in foreign goverrunent loans for the small in..; 
vest or. 
2. Scarcity 21. infomation ga .li'oreign Securities 
Foreign government loans offered a higher rate 
of return and greater security than investment in Belgian 
industry. But the small investor lacked sufficient in-
formation of a reliable type upon which to base his choice 
among the foreign loans available. The Societe wae formed 
to relieve this quantitative and qualitative paucity of 
available information." 
* 2 , P• l l 
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At a later date another company was formed in 
Belgium for the purpose of cooperative investment in wide 
variety of undertakings and to secure a larger return through 
investment in industrial establishments. ~hue, in Belgium 
we find what could be accepted as the beginning of two prin-
ciples which later became the keystone principles of Amer-
ican investment companies; namely, the concepts of diversi-
fication of risk and professional supervision of management. 
3. Unfavorable Return on Domestic Investments 
Grown of the investment company on the continent 
was gradual, as the field of investment banking covered 
these areas to a great extent. •rhis fact is considered to 
be responsible, in a large measure, for the slow develop-
ment of the investment company as a separate channel of 
investment in Uontinental ~urope.* 
Some writers feel tbat the aforementioned com-
panies had little direct effect on the later development 
of the ~ritish and Scotch companies which are the predec-
essors of our own American companies.** 
B. Early :British Investment •rrusta 
1. E.ngland Became .B'inancia 1 Export ins Nat ion 
England did not become a 1 eadi.ng credit or nat ion 
of the world until the close of the Napoleonic Wars. She 
became a financial exporting nation at this time to meet 
* 4. p. 11 
** 2 , PP • 1 2-14 
the needs of her former allies. Russia, Prussia, Austria, 
and Spain in reconstructing war-torn lands and in starting 
agriculture and production anew. 
2. Small Demand for uapital !a ~ritain 
The demand for capital in Britain was small be-
cause of: 
1. The limited mileage of ~ritiah railroads 
2. ~he small ecope of Industrial nevolution in 
Britain as compared with later American 
3. ~land was interested in development of her 
Colonial .i!allpire 
4. ureater interest yield of foreign loans. 
22 
3. Inadequac¥ 2£ Information £a ~oreign Loans ~ Investments 
A drawback here, as in Belgium, with regard to 
foreign loans was the lack of adequate information on 
these investments. l:he British investment trust came into 
being to meet this neea and to enable the middl e-class inves-
tor to obtain accurate infonnation and diversified risk in 
foreign investments. 
The London l!'inancial Association and rrhe Inter-
national l!'inancial Society, which were formed in 1863, are 
regarded as the first British investment trusts. The trust 
medium developed slowly until 1886, only tw eave being formed 
in this time. The decreasing interest yield of Briti~ 
Console, plus the growing factor of British imperialism 
brought on a period of renewed and accelerated activity in 
investment trusts. 
'.i:raditionally,. the individual solicitor or agent 
had been the key factor in ~ritish investment procedure. 
At this time the individual function of the solicitor was 
shifted to the group function of the trust. During this 
transitional period there were few restrictions placed on 
the trusts and some oases of excess and unfortunate invest-
ment led to the inevitable downward revision of capitali-
zation in many of these early trusts.* 
4. Period £! ~cess ~Mistakes 
Another writer baa characterized this early pe~ 
riod - the late eighties - as one in which nearly all of 
the possible mistakes were made and which. in fact. exem• 
plified the period. Portfolios were purchased at hi~ 
prices; trusts participated in banking and underwriting. 
activities outside the trust field. and some of the trusts 
were "promoting and underwriting agencies" in disguise.** 
5. Baripg Crash - ~ 
The Baring Crash of 1890. with its resulting re-
percussions throughout the entire ~ritiah economy. had par-
ticularly baleful effect on the trusts. Baring Brothers 
was an old and honored firm, second only to the Bank of 
England. in financial regard. When this firm became en-
tangled financial difficulty. it carried the whole country 
* 2, PP• 12-14 
** 31 . PP • 6- 7 
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intp depression because of its pre-eminent position. 
Some of the specific abuses indulged in by 
some ~ritish trusts at the time of the Braing Crash were: 
1. ]'ounder's Shares - issued to promoters. ·.t:hese shares 
came in for share of profits after common shares re-
ceived a certain dividend. Promoters took most of 
profits in good years and holders of common stocks 
took the losses of bad years. 
2. Partly paid in shares - common in banks and insurance 
companies and give a reserve which can be called upon 
in times of stress. In inves tment trusts this "robbing 
the surplus" left trusts in bad position at time of 
urash. 
3. Managers of trusts with greatly depreciated portfolios 
formed new companies in which they unloaded these sec-
urities at much greater than their market value. After 
the managers recouped some of their loss, these ne~ 
companies were allQwed to fail.* 
There is on record a british trust, the Debenture 
uorpor ation, wherein at one time founders' shares represen-
ting a ~200 investment had a market value of n300.000. A 
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list of sixteen prominent companies of the times showed that 
of ~13,800,000 in issued capital only b4,000,000 was paid u~** 
* 3 _. pp. 16- 17 
** 31, P• 6 
c. Modern Hietorl .2! ..~:~ritish ;.rrusts 
L. rieappraisal £! Investment Poliol 
W~en the effects of the panic of 1893 in the 
United States were add.ed to those of the ~aring Crash. 
those companies which were heavily invested in America 
were dealt severe blows. ~he resulting revaluation of in-
vestment trust seouri ties in England and ~cotland le ·q. by 
1900. to a startling change in the complexion of the in-
vestment trust. A more conservative investment picture 
was presented than had ever before existed during the first 
quarter century of investment trust growth. 
2. Aided !a Financing ~ranacontinental ~ Systems £! ~· 
The final expansion in American railroads at the 
turn of the century and during the first decade of the twen-
tieth century drew large investments from the ..tlritish Isles. 
A great part of the funds used in forging the last links in 
the transcontinental systems of Harriman, tlill, and Cossatt 
came from ~ritiah trusts. ~his marks the last period of 
large British investment in America as the trusts turned to 
other fields at about this time. 
3. Aided ,!B .ori tish .idnancing £! world fu!!. l 
With the advent of World War I • ..tlritish trusts 
held a large amount of American securities which were us~d 
by the ..~:~ritiah ~overnment to finance a large portion of the 
war's needs. ~hese securities were used to establish a dol-
lar fund which was drawn upon for the purchase of American 
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implements of war. During this period ~ritish trusts in-
vested heavily in british government securities as a pa-
triotic gesture. 
4. Shi~t from American~ ~olonial ~ s outh American 
Investment 
At the close of the war, the united States was 
in a strong financial position and ~ritiah trusts liquid-
ated their remaining American holdings at a large profit. 
and thus were able to recoup some war losses. The United 
States ceased to be a prime area for british trust invest-
ment. More investments were channeled to the British col-
onies and south America. One reason given for this was the 
severity of American income taxes for the times.* 
About this time the investment company medium be-
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gan its first period of expansion in the United States. Be· 
fore leaving the British trusts to cover trust and investment 
company development in the United States. it would be well 
to analyze the philosophy of the British trust, a philosophy 
which governed the first American companies and which is fol-
lowed in varying degrees by the present American investment 
companies. 
D. British Investment Trusts ~ ! Summary 
1. Little Direct Regulation 
Starting with little in the form of direct or 
governmental regulation. the British trusts, during their 
* 2, PP• 14 -20 
first period of growth, became in some instances inetru-
menta of unbridled speculative tendency. Not all trusts 
followed this course, but the effect of the licenses and 
excesses of the few had dire effect on all. 
2. Conservative Investment Policy 
After the Baring Crash those companies which had 
folbwed conservative policies prior to the Crash were able 
to withstand the drastic downward revision in portfolio 
values of this period. From these companies and their con-
servatism we can trace the regrowth of the British trust&. 
A strong tendency toward conservative investment, 
toward the end of preservation of income is noted in the 
British trust to this day. Funds realized through capital 
appreciation, as opposed to interest and dividend income, 
are set aside in surplus for the purpose of aiding the 
funds to maintain dividends during bad times. 
3. More than One Class of Securities 
------ ---- --- _...... 
Moat British companies offer more than one class 
of securities including bonds and hence operate with a lev-
erage factor• In prosperous times this means increased 
payments to holders o:f ordinary or common stocks. In bad 
times the surplus accumulated during the prosperous helps 
the trusts to maintain payments to bondholders. 
4. ~ Failed !a Depression 1929-1933 
A fact pertinent to this summary of important 
events in the history of the British trust .is that although 
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the trusts passed through the depressed world conditions 
of 1929-1933 with heavy capital losses and extensive divi-
dend reductions, only a few cases of reorganization are re-
corded, and not one of these led to a liquidation.* 
Il. History of Investment Trusts in United States 
A. Earll American Companies 
1. Boston Personal Propert3 Trust 
The investment company device was not used in 
this country for quite a number of years after the devel-
opment of ita British predecessor. The Boston Personal 
Property Trust is generally credited with being the first 
American investment company, and it was founded in 1893.** 
2. !21 Important 1g Earll Period 
Little was heard of the investment companies 
formed at this time. They did not generally appeal to the 
small investor of the middle-class segment of the American 
populace. It took a later and more speculative period in 
our financial history--when even the man in the street was 
dreaming the "big dream" of becoming a Wall Street tycoon--
for the investment company de~ice to take hold in the fancy 
of the public. 
3. J!'ollowed British Model 
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Of the companies formed in this early period at 
the end of the nineteenth and in the early part of the twen-
* 31, P• 8 
** 23 , P• 720 
tieth century. most followed the British model. They were 
conservative in investment. conservative in management in 
keeping with the aims of their founders. 
B. Period £! Great Expansion !E£ Popularization 
1. Started in Late 1920's 
.,....._ - -......--..~ 
The period of great expansion in investment com-
panies of the late 1920's was preceded by the formation of 
relatively few companies, some of which have continued to 
this day. During this period of the twenties it is inter-
esting to note the formation of the Massachusetts Investors' 
Trust and the State Street Investment Corporation in Boston 
in 1924. * These are the first of the ''Mutual li'unds" or 
open-end companies which form the basis for this thesis. 
Boston is the home of the mutual fund and has maintained 
a position of importance in this field since that time. 
First Mutual Fund - 1924 
-
The salient feature which differentiates the 
"open-end" company from the "closed-end". which was the 
dominant company in the early period, is the agreement on 
the part of the open-end company to repurchase ita shares 
at net asset value whenever presented for redemption. This 
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is an American innovation having no counterpart in the British 
trusts. 
3. ~ Period - 1927-1929 
* 23. p. 717 
.. : 
The boom period in the late twent.ies in our fin-
ancial history is characterized by the speculative fervor 
which engulfed the seasoned financier and the unseasoned 
citizen alike. All were attempting to wrest from the stock 
market the easy money which appeared to be there for the 
taking. 
4. Engaged ba Speculative Ventures 
The investment company medium appeared to many 
to be the means of gathering in this windfall. The prom-
ises of diversification of risk and professional management 
appealed to the public. and many companies were formed to 
add their impetus to a rising market. Market prices spi-
ralled upward. and capital appreciation inflated the value 
of the investment company portfolio. More companies were 
formed and more investors were found. 
5. Many Failures 1929-1933 
The Bull market broke on October 29. 1929. It 
had been running upward in the face of receding business 
conditione. The results are part of our history. As in 
England after the Baring Crash. the repercussions were felt 
throughout the entire economy. A period of drastic revis-
ion of portfolio values in investment companies became nec-
essary. and many of the companies formed during the previ-
ous bullish times were forced ' to liquidate. 
6. ~Public Confidence 
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Public confidence in the investment company medium 
dropped sharply and a feeling of public indignation began to 
grow. This feeling grew and was later translated into 
legislative action during the 1930's, when many laws were 
passed by the ~ederal Congress which brought about wide-
spread regulation of most financial institutions, includ-
ing the investment companies. 
Grayson, writing in the period leading up to 
the Crash of 1929, outlined four distinct types of Ameri-
can investment trusts; namely, 
1. The "pure" investment trust. or "Anglo-American" trust. 
This t ype, as the name implies, was modeled on the British 
and diversification and constant managerial supervision 
were ita most important qualities. 
2. The "investment fund" trust. This is similar to the 
"pure~ trust, but trustees issued a certificate of parti-
cipation, giving subscriber a direct interest in securities 
held, rather than a collateral interest as in the "pure". 
3. "Bankers' Share" companies. 'J!hese maintain diversifi-
cation but eliminate management to a great degree. 1mnagers 
eelect the list of securities which will compose trust and 
then sell shares with a pro-rata interest in this list. ~he 
block of securities underlying the trust are then deposited 
with a trustee. In some of these trusts, there was no pro-
vision for changing the composition of portfolio, but later 
these trusts were set up with limited powers to change. 
4. ~he "promotive" trust. ~hese trusts week to gain stock 
control of companies. Quite a few were in foreign 
securities.* 
The "promotive" trust and "Bankers' Shares" 
trusts are not true examples of the investment company as 
it later came to be knewn. .Acquisition of control i.n com-
panies ia not a feature of investment companies, and the 
"Bankers' Share" companies performed only 50% of the task 
of the true investment company. 
There was, during this period leading up to Oc-
tober, 1929, some critical appraisal of the investment com-
panies which were beginning to pile up within the framework 
of this medium. ~he Investment Bankers Association of Ameri-
ca recommended at ita annual convention in 1928 that a code 
of practice be set up for investment companies. The New 
York Ourb and Stock Exchanges undertook studies of this move-
ment, and a set of requirements was drawn up by the Stock 
Exchange for those companies wishing to be listed.** 
A sponsor of an investment company warned against 
the dangerous parallel existing at the time with regard to 
the earlier period of "disaster and dl i~;Jgrace" of the Bri-
tiah companies. This sponsor found two common abuses; 
namely, 
1. Investment companies operated primarily to serve inter-
eats of promoters. 
2. Investment companies becoming depository for unmarket-
able securities. 
* 2 , PP• 147-151 
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He traced the common abuses to "dishonesty, 
inattention• inability and greed" on the part of promo-
ters and managers of investment companies.* 
After the urash many articles were written which 
pointed out the specific a buses and deficiencies of invest-
ment company medium. but it was too late to prevent losses. 
These abuses and deficiencies later served as the basis of 
the exhaustive hearings undertaken by the Securities and 
~change uommission which cover many volumes.•* 
In analyzing these volumes it becomes apparent 
that many of the abuses were those of what we classify as 
management investment holding companies as differentiated 
from the management investment company as we know it to-
day. The similarities in structure of these two institu-
tions led to their being investigated together under the 
Public Utility Holding 0ompany Act of 1935. 
u. Depression Histor¥ .Q.f Investment uompanies 
1. Widespread Public Disfavor 
During the thirties the investment company field 
was investigated quite closely, and some of the resulting 
disclosures were given widespread publicity and the medium 
did not flourish to any great extent • .Assets of industry 
declined from $8,000,000,000 at the peak in 1929 to a low 
of ~2.000,000,000 in 1932.*** 
* 30, P• 4 3 
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Three significant developments of the Depression 
period were: {1) the repurchase by managers of great blocks 
of outstanding securities at discounts from holders, (2) 
the purchase of investment companies at small prices by out-
aide interests, notably the Atlas Corporation, and the liq-
uidation of these companies at later date, and (3) the dev-
elopment of special t ypes of investment companies to get 
away from the public disfavor of older types of companies.* 
2. ~ Tlpes £! Investment Companies 
Some of these new forms were fixed and semi-fixed 
trusts which claimed that a large part of management's dis-
cretion was removed. Management companies were in particu-
laredisfavor at the time, and this new type grew for a time. 
Thea e companies resembled "Bankers' Shares" companies, and 
the difficulties of changing the portfolio soon led to ne~ 
forms wherein such provisions were incorporated. Holders 
of old fixed trusts were persuaded to switch to the new 
semi-fixed and suffered some loss in change. 
3. "Open-En.d" Funds ~esan .lQ ~ 
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In 1933 as the market began to turn upward again, 
the public apathy toward management lessened and the open-
end funds, which had been in existence during the boom times, 
but which had escaped much of the public dis favor. became 
dominant factors in the field. 
* 30 . PP• 21-28 
The open-end f ·unds had been a small factor in 
the period before 1929, and in this manner escaped much of 
the criticism of the closed-end companies which were the 
d_ominant factor in the public mind before and after the 
Crash. 
Installment plan companies and face-amount com-
panies enjoyed some public support at this time, but as the 
open-end companies grew in assets and importance, these com-
panies lost ground. Many of the other t ypes changed to the 
open-end form, and from this first impetus the open-end or 
mutual type fund baa grown to ita predominant position in 
the field of investment companies. 
6. Preferential ~ Treatment 
3 5 
In 1936 the "mutual investment company" was given 
preferential tax treatment, and more companies switched to 
this form. This factor of tax treatment ia accorded a place 
of importance in the growth of mutual funds by some authors.* 
6. Investment Company !£! £! 12iQ 
As an outgrowth of the investigations from 1935 
through 1940 under the powers granted in Section 30 of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and as a means 
of preventing the recurrence of some of the abuses and defi-
ciencies uncovered, the Investment Company Act of 1940 was 
passed in the latter part of that year. The passage of the 
* 30 , pp. 26-3 0 
Aot represents what one writer has called the "coming of 
age" of the investment company.* >.· Because of the importance 
of this legislation the next section of this thesis is de-
voted to it. 
D. A Summari 
1. Basic Principles Subverted 
Coincidental to the passage of the Act was the 
beginning of a decade of great growth in the open-end in-
vestment companies. As cited previously, the open-end com-
pany had begun to assume a dominant role in the investment 
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company field after the upturn in the stock market of 1933. 
Between 1933 and 1936 approximately ~360,000,000.00 in shares 
were sold and shares of these companies accounted for moet 
of the sales in investment companies.** In the decade 1940-
1950 asset value rose from approximately ~5oo.ooo.ooo. ***to 
over ~2,500,000,000. as of December 31, 1950.•*** It is only 
in the last decade that the mutual funds have begun to be 
an important factor in the national investment picture. 
Having come to a position which must be recognized 
as important and having given indications of growing to even 
greater importance in the years ahead, the mutual funds have 
lately been subject to examination of their capabilities with 
regard to alleviating the post-war shortage of equity and 
* 
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venture capital. In the report of the President's Econ-
omic Advisors of Januar y, 1949, this factor was mentionea 
and a government investigation of the mutuals' potential-
ities in this field was recommended.* 
2. Mutuals Emerged Dominant 
Among the more important factors which can be de-
duced from this short summary of the highlights of the 
history of investment companies are the following: 
1. Investment companies h8 ve in the past allowed their 
baaic principles to be subverted to speculative gain. 
In the Baring Urash of 1890 in ~land and again in the 
Crash of 1929 in this country, investment companies have 
suffered the dire effects of their own excesses and licen-
ses. ~hese facts should present a grave warning for the 
future. 
2. The emergence of the mutual funds as the leading ele-
ments in the field give promise of ability to tap the middle-
class resources to a growing exten¢. 
* 2~ . p. 716 
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CHAPTER III 
REGULATION OF IWvESTMENT C01~ANIES 
I. Need for Regulation 
A. Abuses .J:)efore Passage £!.. !£i 
1. ~ ,2! Public .tl'ocused on Securities !!!1 .Agencies of 
Investment --
When the full effect of the stock market crash 
of 1929 was felt--in 1933 at the bottom of the depression--
the eyes of the public were turned to the securities markets 
and on those agencies of investment which were popular at 
the time of the crash. 
An aroused p~blic was looking for the reasons be-
hind the crash. It had just elected a new administration 
which promised sweeping investigations and legislation which 
would punish those responsi@le and which would in some meas-
ure prevent a recurrence of those practices prevalent before 
1929. 
The entire field of securities markets was in the 
process of being investigated. ~heee investigations lasted 
until the entrance of the United States into the Second World 
War. ~he intervening years saw the passage of many acts of 
a punitive or regulatory nature. The securities Act of 1933. 
the Securities and ~changes Act of 1934. the Banking Acta. and 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 were some of 
the more important results of the investigations carried on 
under the "New Deal" administration. 
Congress authorized the newly created Securities 
and Exchange Commission to investigate the investment com-
panies industry under Section 00 of the Holding company .Act. 
These investigations were begun in 1935. Questionnaires were 
sent out to the investment companies and many of the leading 
company managers were called to Washington to testify. 
This inquiry took almost five years. It resulted 
in the accumulation of many volumes of testimony which point-
ed up some of the abuses and deficiencies which bad charact-
erized the investment company of the late 1926 1 a. The Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 was the direct result of this search-
ing investigation. 
2. ~tate Regulation Ineffective 
Some state bodies had undertaken to investigate 
the investment companies prior to 1929. "Blue Sky" laws 
were in existence in most of the states prior to the federal 
investigation of securities markets and investment companies. 
~he widespread growth of the investment company 
prior to 1929 had rendered ineffectual most of the state leg-
islation aiming at regulation of the industry. As ia often 
pointed out with regard to the Securities Acta of 1933-34, 
there existed in the different states laws which forbade most 
of the practices which are forbidden in the federal legisla-
tion, but it remained for the J!·ederal Government to put teeth 
into the Acts. 
The efficiency of state regulatory bodies in cop-
ing with the problema of investment companies ranged from 
poor regulation to an almost complete lack · of regulation. 
This was not entirely the fault of the states, as the prob-
lem was one of larger scope than the boundary of any one 
stat e. 
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~he Act of 1940 was designed to render more eff-
ective the regulation of the investment c cmpaniee, and this 
regulation, it was felt, could best be rendered on a national 
level as was the security and exchanges regulation passed at 
an earlier date. 
B. Scope ~ Investment uompanies 
1. Interstate 1£ Nature 
Investment company regulation was made difficult 
at the state level because of the interstate nature of much 
of the business of these companies. Investment companies 
made use of the mails and other devices of interaate commu-
nications. The officers of offending companies were often 
outside the jurisdiction of a state body attempting regula-
tion because such companies were incorporated, or did their 
business from another state. 
Congress felt that investment companies were in a 
position to exercise control over companies engaged in inter-
state commerce. Holding companies were in general disrepute 
especially in the utility industry, and the subject of corp-
orate control was one much discussed at the time. One of the 
prime motives in passing the Act of 1940 was to prevent inves-
tment companies from getting in a position to exercise control. 
2. Public Inter est 
The investment company was felt to be the invest-
ment medium for a substantial part of the national savings. 
For this reason it was deemed against the public interest to 
let certa in conditions exist in the industry, which were det -
ri ental to those savings. 
c. Need Rec ognized Withih Industrz 
1. Industry and Government Cooperated iE Writing Act 
Some of the leaders within the industry recognized 
t 11e need for government regulation and were active in their 
coopera t ion with the committees of Congress and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
Lawyers for the investment companies worked with 
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tnose of t 1e S. E. c. in drafting the Act. The results of their 
combined efforts were presented to Congress, and after short 
hearing s t he bill was passed wit :n but few changes. 
This was anew experience. For the first time indus-
try had work ed together to cooperate .with, rather 
t han obetruct Goverrm1ent officials . lt resulted in 
carefully thought out legislation that has worked 
well in practise. * 
2. bational Association of Investment Comoanies 
vhers the industrj had presented anything but a 
united front during the years of investigation, the desira-
bility of such unity on important matters became apparent 
at this time. The National Association of Investment Com-
panies was formed during this period to be active in matters 
* ll, P• Z2 
affecting t~e industry as a whole and in matters needing 
respresentation before the ~overnment.* 
For the first time the various companies were 
pulled together to form an industry. The association has 
continued as the active voice of the investment company to 
this day. 
II. Investment Company Act 
A. ~efinitions Used in Act 
---
1. "Investment CompaP¥" 
For the purposes of the Act, the investment com-
pany was defined as any issuer of securities that has as 
its principal function that of investing in other securi-
ties.** The company must have over 40% of its total assets 
in securities. 
2. "Face-Amount Certificate Companies" 
Companies which issue or propose to issue face 
amount certificates of installment type. The investor agrees 
to pay the issuer a specified amount in certain installments. 
In return, the company agrees to pay the investor a specific 
sum at a specified maturity date. The sum paid at maturity 
equals the amount paid in, plus cowpound interet on the accu-
mulated payments.** * 
3. "~ Investment Trusts" 
These are investment companies which are organized 
* 11, P• 3 2 
** 13, P• 41 
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under a trust indenture or similar agreement, have no board 
od directors, and issues redeemable securities which repre-
- ~ent an undivided interest in a unit of specified securities. 
This does not include voting trusts.* 
4. ''Management Oompani es" 
This classification includes all investment com-
panies other than face-amount companies and unit trusts. 
5. "Open-End Companies" 
A subdivision of management companies which in-
eludes those companies which have securities outstanding 
which they agree to redeem. ** 
6. "Closed-end Companies" 
This includes all management investment compan-
ies other than "open-end." 
7. "Diversified Companies" 
This is another subdivision of management compan-
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ies. "Diversified" companies are those which have at least 
75% of their assets invested in government bonds or other se-
curities. Not more than 5% of the total assets of a diversi-
fied company can be invested in one outstanding security of 
any one issuer, nor may a diversified company hold more than 
10% of the voting securities of any one issuer.*** 
8. "Non-Diversified Companies" 
This subdivision of management companies includes 
* 32, P • 12 
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all companies other than diversified. Thus. the companies 
most often mentioned in this thesis as being mutual funds 
could more accurately be described as "management diversi-
fied open-end" investment companies.* 
B. Scope .Q! ~ !.91 
1. Inclusions 
The Act is meant to include all investment com-
panies using channels of interstate commerce and of such 
size as to be capable of affecting the public interest. as 
described in an earlier section of this chapter. _, ·= 
2. Exclusions 
Companies whose business is not trading, invest-
ing, or reinvesting in securities; whose certificates are 
not held by more than 100 persona; which are engaged in un-
derwriting; banks and insurance companies; and companies 
subject to other acta and which hold securities of companies 
covered in other acta are exclused. 
Voting trusts, charitable organizations and em-
ployee pension funds are among other exclusions. Companies 
which take the form of investment companies as outlined in 
the act. but which elect not to register as investment com-
panies with the S.E.c •• are quite effectively prevented from 
doing business by being forced to operate in one state and 
**. 
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by being denied the use of the channels of interstate commerce. 
* Z> 2, P• 13 
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c. Provisions of the ~ 
1. Capital Requirements 
Companies which elect to do business as a "reg-
ulated investment company" must have a minimum capitaliza-
tion of $100,000.00. The purpose of this requirement is 
to prevent the formation of investment companies by "shoe-
string" operators. 
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The funded debt of investment companies must have 
an asset coverage of 300% at the time of issue. Senior secu-
ritiea, if stocks, must have an asset coverage of 200% at 
the time of declaration of dividend. 
Registered "open-end" companies are permitted to 
issue only one type of security. Senior securities are 
not permitted. "Senior securities" does not include an is-
sue of preferred or other stock which is preferred as to as-
sets of a certain series of investments which are specific-
ally allocated to the aeries.* 
2. Investment Policy 
Ttt~ management of a company wisbing to register 
.. _ ....._. 
under this act must file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commies ion a statement of policy with regard to the t ype of 
company and the type of investments which the company in-
tends to make. All the requirements of the Securities Acta 
must be complied with as regard securities outstanding and 
to be issued.** 
* 32, PP• 32- 36 
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The vote of a majority of the stockholders is 
necessary before a company can change the type of manage-
ment company 11$ is to operate as or the type of investments 
it intends to deal in. In the case of common law trusts. 
provisions are made for getting the holders' approval of 
any proposed changes.* 
Investment companies are required to submit a~ 
annual reports to the Commission. Most companies make quar-
terly reports. 
3. Management !a! Sponsorship 
Management contracts may not be sold. Contracts 
with investment advisors are for periods of two years and 
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must be renewed by a majority of board of directors or stock-
holders entitled to vote. After the original two-year peri-
od these contracts must be renewed yearly.** 
4. Boards £! Directors 
In order to prevent a po asible conflict of inter-
eat or of . "self-dealing," certain requirements must be met 
in selecting a board of directors. 
The majority of the board must be independent o£ 
the sales or distributing organization of the company. 40% 
of the board must be "outsiders." not connected with the in-
vestment advisor of the company. Some of the mutual funds 
have "insiders" boards, and these companies are not permitted 
* 32 , P• 25 
** 13, P• 42 
to charge a sales load. 
The majority of the board must not be invest-
ment bankers or brokers for the company. Changes in the 
board must be voted on by sha reholders except under cer-
tain conditione such as death of a member between meetings. 
In general. these are the provisions of the act 
relating to the composition of the board of directors. Cer-
tain specific provisions ha ve not been enumerated. The pur-
pose of the restrictions is to ~nsure qualified directors 
free of conflicting interests with those of the investment 
company. 
5. Sale of Securities 
--
Compliance with the provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933 ia required except that the provisions for reg-
istration of securities are somewhat modified in that the 
investment company files a shorter registration form. * 
Sales must be made for cash or for securities. 
No securities may be issued for services or for property. 
The net asset value must be computed by a method which 
gives unifoxmity to t he quotations of the different compan-
ies. ** 
The offer of redemption must not be sus pended 
for a period during which the New York Stock Exchange is 
open or during which trading is carried on at the Exchange 
* 3 2 , p. 4 1 
** 32 , p . 38 
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unless ~n emergency exists with regard to the company or 
for such time as the Commission may allow for protection. * 
6. Other Provisions 
Margin purchases and short selling are in moat 
cases forbidden along with participation on a joint and 
several basis in a trading account. 
It was the intent in the original draft of the 
Act to set a limit over which investment companies regis-
tered under the Act could not grow. This provision was el-
i minated, but the Commission is empowered to investigate 
any companies which it feels are exerting too much control 
or give indication of an "undesirable concentration" of 
wealth. 
The dividends received from the companies must 
be segregated as to their source. ~rnings which are part 
of the dividend and interest payments on the securities in 
the portfolio must be recoried as such. Those which result 
from trading activities and from capital appreciation which 
has been realized must also be recorded as such. 
D. Results 1940-1950 
1. ~ Complete Information 
Tthe registered investment company must file re-
ports semi-annually with the Becurities and ~chang es Com-
mission. ~hese same reports must be submitted to the share-
holders. Information as to securities held, changes in 
portfolio, salaries and expenses of operation as well as 
* 32, pp. ~ 9 -40 
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financial statements are presented to the holder of in-
vestment company shares. 
2. Sanctions Under the Act 
--
The uommisaion is empowered to seek the follow-
ing penalties for willful infraction of the rules. Up 
to two years imprisonment and large fines are the stiff-
est of the penalties. Individuals convicted of perform-
ing acts which are in violation of the law are likewise 
forbidden to serve in executive or advisory capacities 
in the investment company field. 
~he uommission has registered 69 new invest-
ment companies in the period July 1, 1944-June ~0, 1949. 
It has analyzed a large number of required statements and 
has prescribed rules and regula tiona for the indus try. 
One such rule was tl~t which required the bonding of those 
officers and employees of the companies who came into con-
tact with the assets of the company. 
Litigation under the act brought about the die-
solution of a "closed-end" company, the Aldred Investment 
~rust. An officer of this company was convicted of chang-
ing the investment policy of an investment company without 
prior consent of the shareholders.* 
~. Increased Public Participation 
T~e part that this legislation has played in 
·-
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the growth of the investment companies over the past decade 
* 29, PP • 151-158 
is acknowledged to be of major import. ·.t:he greatest 
growth of this industry came after the passage of the 
Act in 1940. ~his increased activity can be consid-
ered as a direct result of the passage of the Invest-
ment uompany Act. 
Since the passage of this Act the operations 
of investment companies have been carried on in full view 
of the public. These investment companies are among the 
most regulated in the land. With increa sed knowledge has 
come increased public confioence in the investment company 
medium. This is the true measure of the effect of the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940. 
III. Self Regulation 
A. Charter Provisions 
1. Restrictions £a Borrowing 
In addition to those provisions which are cov-
ered in the Investment Company Act, some of the mutual 
funds ha ve incorporated in their charters or trust inden-
tures other restrictions ~hich the individual managements 
deem necessary. One of the restrictions most often in-
cluded is the restriction placed on borrowing. Some of 
the typical companies making this restrictions are broad 
Street Investing Corporation. Bullock Fund, and Chemical 
Fund, Inc.* 
* 24 . p p . 7-87 
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2. Restrictions 2£ Unseasoned Securities ££ 9~mEani~~ 
The aforementioned Ohenli cal Fund may not pur-
chase securities of companies which do not have 3 years 
of continuous operation or of companies which are not on 
an approved list which is filed with the ~ustodian of 
the ..i!~und. * 
Aeronautical Securities, Inc., may not invest 
over 20~ of ita assets in securities which are not list-
ed on the New York Stock or ~urb Exchanges. ** General 
Investors Trust broadens this coverag e to include securi-
ties listed on the London and Montreal Exchanges.*** 
B. Industrial Associations 
1. National Association E.! Investment ,Comrnrl 
This association, formed during the industry's 
first period of cooperation in 1940. at the time of the 
passage of the Investment Company Act, is intended to serve 
as the industry's spokesman in relations with congress and 
the public. 
2. Mutual ~ Institute 
This organization was formed in July of 1949 
for the three-fold purpose of: 
1. The establishment of common meeting ground between 
l~ASDA and the Mutual Funds for discussion of regula-
tory problelllB. 
* 
** 
*** 
~t:. B: g1 
24. p. 41 
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2. Developing a better public understanding and accept-
ance of mutual funds. 
3. Finding means, through research, whereby mutual funds 
can improve their service to the public and to the 
economy as a whole.* 
3. National Association of Securities Dealers of America 
- ------
This is a quasi-regulatory body formed by the 
investment dealer s of the United States to aid in the en-
foreement of the Securities and ~changes Act of 1934. It 
performs many of the regulatory and enforcement duties as-
sociated with this Act in the over-the-counter markets of 
the United States. Because of the scope of this market 
and because of the difficulties which would mitigate against 
effective regulation by the Securities and ~changes Com-
mission. this body took over this task. 
As the mutual funds are sold through a wide net 
of investment dealers in an over-the-counter market, the 
NASDA has a say in regulating the practices of the mutual 
fund distributors with regard to the provi s ions of the 
Securities and Exchanges Act. 
IV. Tax negulatione 
A. Revenue Act of 1936 
----------
1. ~ Problem 
The Congress of the United States was consider-
ing drastic upward revision of corporate taxes in 1936. A 
committee of three of the leaders of the Boston Investment 
companies went to Washington to plea d for the fair treat-
* 23, p. 716 
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ment of mutual fund shareholders. 'l'hese funds were 
faced with an extra layer of taxation since the funds 
from which dividends were paid, had been taxed at the 
corporate level before the investment companies received 
them, and they were later taxed, when paid out by the 
mutual funds, to the holders of investment company shares. 
The Congress exempted mutual investment compan-
ies from 90~ of the corporate income tax, if this 90% was 
paid out by the funds as a return to their holders. The 
investment companies had to pay out securities profits as 
well as investment income in order to take full advantage 
of the law.* 
2. "Supplement ~" 
After the passage of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, the provisions of the ~evenue Act of 1936 
were made available to "regulated investment companies" as 
definied in the Act of ~940. In order to gain the advan-
tages of this legislation, an investment company had to 
meet the following conditions. 
1. 90~ of the companies gross income had to be derived 
from dividends, interest, and gains from sale or other 
disposition of stocks or securities 
2. Lees than 30% of the companies groww income was de-
rived from the sale or other disposition of stock or se-
curities h eld for less than 3 months 
3. At least half of the assets of the investment company 
are represented by cash and securities of not more than 5~0 
of t h e total securities of any one company; or more than 
10~ of the voting securit i es of one company 
* 11, p. 26 
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4. No one issue represents more than 25% of the assets 
of the investing company 
5. If the company elects to be a "regulated investment 
company" under provisions of Bupplement Q.* 
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CHAPTER IV 
MUTU.AL INVESTMENT QQ&_'IP.ANIES 
Introduction 
As previously cited, at the end of uhapter 
II, the "open-end" or mutual fWld type of investment com-
pany emerged--after the short-lived period of popularity 
for the "unit" and "fixed trust" in the early thirties--
as the dominant factor in the investment company field. 
Some of the reasons for this growing public acceptance of 
the mutuals can be traced back to the events leading up 
to 1929. 
In the period of the twenties few of the invest-
ment companies formed were of the "open-end" t ype. The 
few that were formed did not enjoy the public favor to the 
extent enjoyed by the "closed-endn companies. When the 
Crash came in 1929 and sent investment companies into the 
long decline--which aroused the public to demand action 
from the government--most of the opprobrium was directed 
at the "closed-end" funds. 
This tendency to place the blame on the "closed-
end n companies allowed the mutual funds to begin to slowly 
grow when the long climb out of the depression began in 
1933. While the investigations centered on theabuses and 
deficiencies of the "closed-end" companies, the mutual funds 
began a period of growth which has continued to the present 
time. .Although the foregoiP~ factor may have been a stimu-
lus to the initial growth of the mutual funds, it does not 
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any hin~ as to the pause of their later and most spectacu-
lar period of growth during the decade 1940-1950. 
I. Features of "Open-End" Companies 
A. Differed from "Closed-End" --~~~ ---- . 
1. ~epurchaae £! Shares 
A study of the basic features of the "open-end" 
funds may give us more of an insight into the reasons be-
hind their growth in the last decade. 
The mutual investment company is sometimes 
called the "investment cooperative" because it bears some 
outward evidences of the cooperative movement in other 
fields. •rhi s cooperative analogy is nowhere so strongly 
evidenced as in the right of redemption at net asset value 
which is among the strong selling points of the mutua~ 
funds. 'l'he holder of a mutual fund share is entitled to 
present his share to the issui~~ company at any time and 
receive in return his pro rata share of the assets of the 
company figured as of the time the certificate is presented. 
The net asset value of shares in active. widely held funds 
is usually calculated twice daily. 
This feature is basic to the mutual fund idea. 
and in it the funds bave found a factor of broad popular 
appeal among the small investors. ~his marks the first 
great difference in the mutuals as compared with the nclosed 
end" companies which make no such offer--the price of these 
shares being settled in the market just as for other corpor-
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ate securities. 
2. O~ntinuous Issue of !!! Shares 
Another point in which the mutual fund differs 
from the "closed-end" companies is in the manner of issu-
ing new shares. 'l'he mutual funds are for the most part. a 
notable exception is the State Street Investment uompany 
which has not done so in some years, issuing new shares, 
whereas t he "closed -end" companies are capitalized more in 
the manner of other corporations and have a stated and 
aut horized capitalization. 
"Open-end" companies have been forbidden, since 
the passage of tne Investment uompany Act, to issue senior 
securities. "Closed-end" companies have a more convention-
al capital structure with bonds and preferred stocks as well 
as common. ·xhe "closed -end" companies have "leverage" gen-
erally while there is but one mutual fund which features 
leverage at this time. ·.t:ha t ie .ttepublic Investors J!•und. * 
Another important difference is evidenced in 
t hat nopen-end" company shares are distributed through a 
vast net of dealers in many cities throughout the country, 
while "cloa ed-end" shares are traded on the exchanges. 
B. T~·pee £.! Mutual .l!'und s 
1. ~ Classifications 
"Open-end" compa nies are class ified in four 
main groups by some authors. ~hese classifica tions are: 
*13 , P• 23 
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1. 0ommon Stock .l!'unda 
2. jjalanced .tl'unda 
3. Industry ·rype l!unde 
4. Class of Securities .tfunda* 
Wieaenberger takes a different view toward 
classification and places groups 3 and 4 in a single class 
called "Bonds and ::3 pecial ty .irunds. "** 
2. Common Stock l!'und s 
Common stock funds have over the last few years 
become the largest in assets and in numbers of all the mu-
tual funds. vithin this group are some of the oldest funds. 
Within this classification the investment plana followed by 
the individual funds are varied. Some emphasize "blue chip" 
stocks and a steady i~ corue, while others emphasize "growth" 
stocks and capital appreciation. 
3. .t;alanced l!'und s 
Balanced funds hold varying proportions of com-
mon and preferred stocks and bonds. ·..~.:hese funds offer a 
more complete investment program than funds holding only 
stocks or bonds. As changing economic conditions warrant, 
the proportion of each class of security is shifted. Safety 
of ca pital, regularity of i ncome, and a middle-of-the-road 
investment policy are characteristic of this group t** 
4. Specialtl Eunds 
Funds falling in the last two categories--class 
* 23 , p. 720 
** 5, P• 101 
*** 5 , PP• 102-103 
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of Securities l!-:unds and lndustry .l!·unds--specialize in 
one type of industry such as Automobi les or Aviation or 
in one type of security, usually bonds. 
The following table shows the relative im-
portance of the various classes of mutual funds. .As of 
December 31, 1950, there were 85 mutual funds of ~1 mil-
lion or over in net assets. These 85 funds form the bas-
is for the table. 
•.rABLE I 
Relative Importance of various Glasses £! !~ 
Group Net Asset value tl950) ~ of iota1 
38 uommon Stock 1,159,200,000. 48~ 
26 ~alanced ~unds 790,400,000. 32 
21 ~ond and ~pecialty 531,100,000. 20 
Source: Mutual ~'Und Directory* 
Wiesenberger gives the following table to 
show how the trend of the past few years has been toward 
the uommon Stock .Jfund s. 
'fABLE II 
Trend of .Annual Net Sales E.l ulass £1 .l!'unds 
Year 39 uommon 26 Balanced 26 ~pecialt3 ~! 
1949 487o 387o 147o ~278 ,000,000. 
1948 50 47 3 147,000, ooo. 
1947 35 38 27 178,000,000. 
1946 25 28 47 227,000,000. 
1945 17 24 59 182,000,000. 
~ource: Investment Dompaniee ** 
5. Some ~Jommon ~tock .l!'unds E.£1 Included .!.g :r:hat Dla ssifica-
tion 
In the first ta .ble, those common stock funds 
which make up the Keystone 0ommon 8tock ~eries are included 
* 24, PP• 7-100 
** 5, p. 102 
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in the ~and and Specialty vlaas aa well as the common 
stock series of other funds. If these funds were to be 
included in the vommon ;;stock J!·und classification, the 
net assets of that group would be greatly increased. 
~here are within these classes, funds offer-
ing a wide variety of investment objectives and governed 
by a variety of investment policies. ~ ithin a vlass, 
funds of divergent investment policy cannot be equitably 
compared as to results. 1:0 compare the operating results 
of a fund within the uommon ::;took ~oJlass with those of a 
fund within either of the other classes would be unrealis-
tic. 
In selecting a mutual fund, the small investor 
should have an investment objective. After determining 
this objective, the investor can then select the fund which 
beat meets this objective. The teat of results ia then 
one of meeting this objective and of the cost of meeting 
this objective. 
C. Advantages of mutual Funds 
1. In C:r eneral 
Among the following advantages which will be 
cited with reference to mutual funds are some which apply 
to the investment company medium in general rather than to 
the mutual funds in particular. Tho a which apply to the 
general field, and regarding which we will go into more 
elaborate detail, are diversification, constant professional 
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supervision, and safety of principal. 
These points are usually mentioned in any dis-
cussion of the investment company field, and its advan-
tages--to the small investor--over the individual investor-
managed investment of funds. It is conceivable that a 
small investor could manage his investments quite capably 
and meet, through his own efforts, whatever investment obj-
ective he had set. 
It would take intelligence, painstaking research, 
and time--possibly more time than the investor could afford 
to give. Hence, we have one of the paramount reasons for 
the existence of the investment company. 
2. Diversification 
D±versification is a cardinal principle of suc-
cessful investing . 'l'hrough diversification the investor 
attempts to mi ni mize the risk of loss of capital. It rep-
resents, in the investment field, the application of the 
"law of averages." It represents that policy which is more 
popularly stated as "not putting all of one's eggs in a 
single basket." 
The risk of outright loss or dimunition of capi-
tal is present in all forms of investments--but to varying 
degrees. '.I.: here are no riskless investments. l!.'ven those in-
vestments which appear at first glance to present no risks, 
such as, government bonds, savings banks deposits, and life 
insurance policies do include the possibility of a long-term 
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loss. 
This loss could be represented by the dirmini-
tion o£ the purchasing power which is represented in the 
fixed dollar amounts which are paid at maturity to holders 
of government bonds or of insurance policies. ~he present 
inflation brings this point quite forcibly to mind. The 
bonds and insurance policies purcba sed with 193 9 dollars 
or 1930 dollars are being retired in 1951 dollars which 
represent about one-half the purchasing power of the earlier 
dollars. 
In corporate securities the risk is, of course, 
greater since there is the added risk of fluctuations in 
the market prices of the corporate securities. The problem 
of eliminating this risk--as far as is possible--is met, in 
great measure, by a properly implemented plan of diversifica-
tion. 
Instead of atempting to pick, or a few, securities 
which will offer steady return over a period of time, the 
principle of diversification implies that many securities 
will be purchased. If some companies get into difficulty, 
as they surely will, the entire investment will not be lost, 
since the remaining companies will not necessarily bave to 
get into financial difficulties or suffer loss. 
The investor instead of trying to make perfect 
choices in all his investments--a task which has in the past 
been beyond human powers-- makes a variety of choices. He 
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will invest in a representative segment of American indus-
tries or witnin a certain industry, The chance that all will 
fail, or t hat the greatest percentage will fail, is very remote. 
The percentage which do fail however, will be cov-
ered by the greater percentage which do not fail. ~he small 
investor, limited first by the small amount of his investible 
funds and secondly by his lack of investment skill and expe-
rience, is the most likely to attempt investment without pro-
per diversification, and as a concomitant factor, most likely 
to suffer a great loss. 
Many small investors essay into the market without 
proper diversification and suffer losses in the ordinary fluc-
tuantion in the market prices of securities. ~his loss is, 
to the small investor, a great economic tragedy, and it very 
often makes the small investor who has lost a vehement critic 
of the stock markets, 
Rather t han have these small investors enter the 
markets without t he protection afforded by proper diversifi-
cation, it would be better for these investors and for the 
~onomy as a whole if they would take advantage of the difersi-
fication which the mutual funds make available. 
This diversification offered by the mutual fund 
industry is nowhere else available to the small investor. 
Other investment devices and mediums are too expensive for 
the small investor and in general do not want to be both-
ered with the small amount the small investor usually deals in. 
An investment in Massachusetts Investors Trust 
at a recent price of $38.43 would have represented a share 
in the earnings of over 130 American corporations. This 
investment would have covered a wide segment of industry 
with natural gas companies, oil companies, railroads, pub-
lie utilities, and other industries covered in the port-
folio.* Massachusetts Investors Trust is the oldest and 
largest of the mutual funds and a uommon Stock b'und. 
The investor who desired a more balanced diver-
sification of a Balanced Fund could have invested in Wml-
lington ~und as of December 31, 1950, which offered parti-
cipation in the earnings of 115 common stocks, 48 pre-
ferred issues and 17 bond issues.** 
In the Specialty Funds Keystone Custodian Fund 
Common Stock ~eriea Sl was invested in over 40 common 
stock s in high grade corporations.*** The same company of-
fers series in 10 different classes of corporate securities. 
Their i nvestment Bond Series Bl included 37 separate bond 
issues. **** 
The diversification offered in these representa-
tive funds is beyond the scope of even some of the largest 
investors. It is far beyond the scope of any small inves-
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tor in any investment medium outside the mutual fund industry. 
* 10 , PP• 14-15 
** 12, PP• 12-13 
*** s. P• 5 
**** 7. p . 5 
Diversification is a principle which is fol-
lowed by large, wealthy investors, who could stand some 
loss. It follows logically that it is a necessity for 
the small investor who can ill afford a loss. 
3. Continuous Professional Supervision 
Although diversification of risk is a cardinal 
principle of successful investing, it is not in itself 
sufficient to prevent loss. Equally important is constant 
professional supervision of the investment portfolio. While 
succes~ful investment starts with diversification, it is 
necessary that the investment portfolio be constantly an-
alyzed with the end in view of changing the composition of 
the portfolio as changng economic factors show such changes 
to be necessary. 
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An investment once selected must not be put aside 
and forgotten. To do so would be to invite unnecessary risk 
or, in the extreme, disaster. The ability to s upervise the 
investment portfolio is in itself an art. The myriad forces 
which are playing on the economy, and on different industries 
and companies within the economy, are difficult to analyze, 
since many are hidden in a mass of detail and are not read-
ily apparent to the average investor until it is too late to 
act on them. 
Skill in analyzing such detail is the result of 
experience--personal experience or the recorded experiences 
b~ btpsr~ in the field. The average small investor has not 
achieved this skill. The time necessary to acquire such 
skills is denied the small investor. ~he average investor 
must look to others, who have made the study of securities 
and industries their profession, for the advice and guid-
ance which successful investment entail. 
The investor of sufficient means can get this 
necessary advice and guidance from that group of profes-
sional investment counsel who are set up to perform this 
work. This professional counsel is expensive, since the 
minimum fees established by the majority of the good in-
vestment services is one which the small or medium sized 
investor cannot always afford. 
Other groups have been set up which perform 
part of the task by supplying some of the necessary in-
formation. But the final task of acting on the informa-
tion supplied, of making the changes in the portfolio, is 
left up to the individual investor. The individual in-
vestor does not always act as quickly as is necessary and 
suffers a loss. 
66 
]ior the small investor, the mutual fund mechan-
ism offers a means by which professionally competent in-
vestment advisors manage the portfolio and make the neces-
sary changes in its composition. This portfolio management 
is performed in an objective and unbiased manner, and for the 
mutual fund industry in general it is performed well. This 
management task is performed by the mutual funds in a much 
more proficient manner than it could be performed by the 
greatest majority of individual investors. 
In the long run, competent portfolio management 
is absolutely necessary to a successful investment plan. 
The small investor cannot give his individual attention tQ 
each problem of portfolio management as it arises. He needs 
professional management. Within the mutual fund industry 
this professional management is made available to the small 
investor, and because his investible funds are combined with 
those of other small investors, the cost is one which the 
small investor can bear. 
4. Safety £! Principal 
In achieving the first requirements of success-
ful investment--sufficient diversification and competent 
professional management--the investor is well on his way to 
achieving the desired end of safety of principal. Diversif-
ication and superv i sion are necessary to achieve safety of 
principal. 
~his safety of principal is a relative factor. 
As stated before, t h e risk of loss or impairment of capital 
67 
is present in all security purchases, but to varying degrees. 
'fhis safety is dependent upon factors within the contro 1 of 
mutual fund managers and upon those over which the management 
ha s little or not any control. ln achieving the greatest 
measure of safety in those factors which are controllable, the 
effect of the uncontrollable factors is in that measure 
minimized. 
~he economic and psychological factors which 
influence security markets and prices are for the most 
part beyond the control of managers. Astute management 
can in many instances. however. see these factors growing 
in importance and make adjustments in the portfolio which 
will protect against the full effect of the economic and 
ps ychological factors. 
In the quality of the stocks or bonds held by 
a mutual fund, in the quality of the fund's investment 
managewent. and in the diversification offered in the 
fund's portfolio, we have factors within the powers of 
management to control. It is a duty of management to 
protect its investors against any unnecessary loss of 
principal. '.J.:he quality of a fund •s management constitutes 
one of the most important indices of safety of principal. 
Past records of the individual funds are avail-
able to t h e pros pective investor. The composition of man-
agement is available in the mutual fund • s prospectus. The 
professional reputation of the management can be ascertained 
though it will take some seeking. It is to the best interest 
of the prospective investor that he make this search in order 
to get the best possible investment bund nbuyn of his money • 
..:ome critics of the mutual funds have stated that 
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the fund industry has not been sufficiently seasoned--tha t 
the funds have not been tested by severe depression or a 
major stock market upheaval. Most of the present day funds 
were founded after the ~ra sh in 1929. ~ritics would argue 
that until the industry ha s been tested by severe market up-
heavals it cannot make a strong and valid claim with regard 
to safety. 
'.L:he bare fact t i:1at the majority of mutual funds 
have not been through a complete business cycle is irrefu-
table. .Jrourteen of the present-day companies were, however. 
formed prior to the market crash in late 1929. Among the 
fourteen are represented some of the largest firms in the 
industry today. ·1:hese companies have been tested by time. 
'l'.heyrepresent over one third of the present assets of the 
i ndustry . 
A large number of the remaining funds were faun-
ded prior to the stock market break in 1938. ~his break 
does not compare in scope, or effect, with that of 1929, 
but it does represent a form of seasoning for a great piJr-
tion of the mutual fund industry. 
~ABLE III 
Mutual l!1unds Founded :Prior to 1929 urash 
Fund 
MaSSachusetts Investors Trust 
State Street Investwent Corp. 
Incorporated Investors 
Mutual Investment Fund, Inc. 
Bond Inv. Trust of America 
Scudder, Stevens & Clark (2) 
.!founded 
1924 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1926 
1928-29 
Assets (1950} 
:jp 362,563,099. 
87,962,793. 
96,781,398. 
810,258. 
6,931.155. 
34. 7 29 ,145. 
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.l:!'und 
Fidelity Investment Assoc., 
Century Shares ~rust 
Founded 
lnc.l928 
1928 
1929 
1929 
Broad St. Investment uorp. 
General Capital uorp. 
Loomis-Sayles Mutual Fund Inc. 
Wellington Fund 
Wisconsin Investment Company 
Total 
Source: Mutua 1 
1929 
1929 
1929 
..l!'und 
5. ~ .Q1 Acquiring !ill£ Divesting 
Assets (1950 
985,462. 
29.985,341. 
l 7 • 04 5 • 241. 
12,773,836. 
1'7,'741,333. 
154,486.613. 
3,011,9,1Q. 
~822,550,496. 
Directory* 
Mutual fund shares are sold by a large network 
of distributors which covers the major centers of the na-
tion . The pro~pective purchaser is, in most cases, within 
the territory covered by this network. Mutual fund shares 
are available in all sections of the country. 
An i mportant feature of the mutual funds is the 
ease with which shares in these funds can be turned in and 
redeemed for cash. The holder can present these shares to 
the issuing company or one of its many agents and receive 
the net asset value represented by the shares as computed 
for that day. ~his net asset value is computed from the 
market value of the securities in the funds portfolio as 
of the day the shares are turned in. This asset value ia 
comput ed twice daily in the more active funds. 
Some funds are authorized to charge a l~& redem-
ption fee, but for the most part this fee is not i mposed at 
t h is time. The initial selling cost of the mutual fund shares 
* 24. pp. 7-100 
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covexs this cost of redempt ion. as well as expense entailed 
in the sale of mutual fund shares. 
6. Uonvenience ~ ll'lexibilit¥ 
Two other f ac tors. not as important as those 
previously cited. but which are advanta ges of the mutual 
funds. ane convenience and flexibility. 'l'he holder of 
mutual fund shares g€ts one dividend check representing 
hts interest and dividends on a larg e portfolio of securi-
ties. ~his payment is fur ther broken down into dividend 
payments and the capital gains resulting from the sale of 
securities. jj'Or tax purposes this breakdown is necessary . 
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Mutual funds represent wide varieties of invest-
ment ob jectives . The investor can find siP..gle funds or 
combinations of funds which will satisfy his personal in-
vestrc..ent plan. It is in this regard that mutual fund shares 
can be regarded as a flexi ble. or adaptable. investment medium. 
II. Criticism of Mutual Funds 
A. "Sales Load" 
1. Excessive 
Among the first criticisms to be ¥oiced against 
the mutual funds was one which is still heard today; nalliely. 
the mutual fund shares aneexpensive to purchase because of 
an excessive sales load. ~he selling charge which is incor-
porated in t h e "asked" quotation over and above the net as-
set value at the time of purchase has been vigorously de-
bated for some time. 
~hie charge varies from 6 to 9%*among the greater 
number of mutual funds. 'J.:here are but three distributors 
who have sold their shares at net asset value. These are 
Loomis-Sayles and Scudder. Stevens and Ulark--who at present 
sell in this manner--and State Street Investment Company 
which at one time sold at net asset value but which has not 
issued new shares in quite some time. 
2. Large Selling Organization 
One of the major reasons advanced for this char g e 
is the contention that the wide sales net of distributors 
and dealers is maintained from part of the proceeds of this 
initial sales charge. It is this net which makes mutua 1 fund 
shares easy to purcha se or divest. ~he maintename of this 
net is to the investor's advantage; hence, he should bear 
the cost of its maintenance. 
In computing the sales price of shares in the 
various series of the Keystone Custodian ]'Unda. an initial 
charge equal to 9.05% of net asset value is added. Thia 
amounts to 8.3/o of sales price. ..l:!·rom this t h e principal 
underwriter . ~he Keystone Company of Boston, receives 3.15~ . 
Other deal ers receive 5/o• The Keystone Custodian l!'unds, 
Inc., receives .07~ and .08~ is held in escrow by the Penn-
sylvania uompany for Banking and ·rrusts. ** The greater por-
tion of the "initial load" is taken in commis sions by the 
* 13 . p. 23 
** 6 9 • p. 
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dealers in the mutual fund shares. 
3. Other Costs uovered in Initial Load 
-
The sales load covers both buying and selling 
costs of the shares. Brokerage fees are entailed in the 
buying and selling of securities in the ordinary markets. 
If the purchase is in "odd lots" t he fees are higher. In 
disposing of ordinary securities there is an added transfer 
c.tlarge as well as brokers commissions. 'fhe mutual funds do 
not extract any charge at the time the shares are redeemed 
at the present time. ~here are. however, some provisions 
for redemption or liquidation charges in some fund charters. 
~hese provisions would not be exercised under any but the 
most extraordinary circumstances. 
Salesmen's commissions are hidden in most trans-
actions. but in mutual funds they are in the open to be seen 
and in some cases misunderstood. Life insurance salesmen and 
other salesmen who sell direct are paid a commission. ~ utual 
fund salesmen are paid a commi ss ion, also. 
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In summarizing the different costs which are inclu-
ded in the sales load--costs which the investor would have to 
pay were he to purchase securities in the ordinary manner-
we have included initial brokerag e fees which are part of 
every aecuri ty transaction. 'fhe minimum brokerage fees are 
charged by dealers in listed securites and in full lot tr~ns­
actions. If the inve stor contemplates purchase of unlisted 
securities or in "odd lots". the fees are higher. 
The small investor would most logically be ex-
pected to pay the highest brokerage charges, since h~ would 
be buying in "odd lots." There are other charges which are 
paid at the time of selling securities through the ordinary 
challn€ls which are not entailed in the sale of mutual fund 
shares. ~hese charges are the brokerage fee at time of sel-
ling, plus transfer charges. 
The sales load of mutual fund shares is not ex-
cessive when one considers that they cover both buying and 
selling costs and t hat t~ey cover the costs of maint a ining 
the wide network of dealers which make the purcr~se and re-
demption of mutual fund shares more convenient for the in-
vestor. 
The advice is often given to prospective pur-
chasers of mutual f und shar es that they should not "trade" 
in these shares. ~hey should amortize these sales loads 
over a period of years. Trading in mutual fund shares can 
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be quite expensive because of the sales load. 'J:he purchase 
of mutu_al fund shares should not be lightly made, only to 
find that the wrong fund has been purchased. Investigation 
prior to purchase, the selection of a fund which meets the 
investment objective of the purchaser and an amortization of 
of the sales load over the period of the first few years that 
the shares are held will give much more satisfactory results. 
The mutual fund industry has long been on the 
defensive with regard to the criticism of the sales loa d. 
Not all of this criticism com es from foes of t he mutual 
fund idea. Some who believe in the intrinsic worth of 
mutual funds are bother ed by the sa les load. •rhe Mutual 
Fund Institute is directing some of its attentions t~~ ard 
analyzing t h e reasonable criticism of the sales load. * 
It is not wit hin the s cope of this paper to 
give more tnan a cursory examination of this factor. I 
have given this sub ject this space because the factor of 
sales load is mo st strongly criticized and is a criticism 
which t he mut ual funds must overcome in order to enlarge 
their scope and acceptance • 
.B. Managemen! ~ 
1. Defensible 
.Another cost which is more easily defended 
t han t h e "loading charge" is that charge which is extr acted 
from t h e fund's income to pay ita management. Mana gement 
fees are charged by all professional investment counsel. 
Th e fee is usually stated as a percenta ge- of the 
asset va lue of t he fund as of a certain t i rue or times. '.l.'hia 
fee covers salaries of off icers, paym ents for investment 
counsel, and the expenses of t h e office, and the s a lari e s 
of administrative and cl erical employees necessary to the 
operation of the fund. 
* 23 , P• 715 
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The average operating expense for 40 funds in 
1949 was from 0.70 to 1.10~ of net asset value of the funds.* 
The costs c overed in thes e operating expense figures cover 
both mana gement and other operating costs. The management 
fees accounted for l/2 of l 7o on t he average for the industry. ** 
In computing the management fee of Massachusetts 
Investors 'l'rust, the trustees take no more t han 57o of the 
gross earn ings of the 'l' rust, excluding capita l gains and 
lo sses for each quarter, and based on no more than 60 mil-
lion shares. ln 1949 the rate was leas than 3.5~ because 
t h ere were over 9 million shares outstanding.*** 
The wellington ..trund 's .management fee is based on 
a sliding scale. It ranges from l/2 of 1~ on first ~ 70,000, 
000. to 1/4 of 1~ on ass ets over ~120,000,000. It is based 
on average net assets of ea ch quarter. ~ *** 
2. h esults ~ Important 
The actual management fee and tota l operating 
expense is not in itself an indication of the com parative 
efficiency of any particular fund. .A low management fee 
is not in itself an indication of the quality of a given 
fund's management. 
In compa ring res ults over a period of time, the 
illanagewent fee becomes impo r tant·. If a company with a low 
* 13 , P• 24 
** 2~. P• 7~5 
*>~--* ll, P• ~4 
****12, P• 
management cost gives an impressive performance and pays 
a better-than-average return, the indication would be 
that the management is very capable. 
A high management cost on the other hand might 
indicate a good management if, for this high fee, the 
managellient was producing good results. 
Management costa on the average for the mutu-
al funds represent 1/2 of 1~ for those funds which compute 
the management cost on average net asset value. Although 
there are funds charging as little as 1/4 of 1~ and as 
high as a 1~ charger per year, funds which charge this on 
the basis of gross income per quarter get 5 or 6'fo • Cen-
tury Shares Trust gets 1/4 of 1~ . which is the lowest fig-
ure and Loomis-Sayles gets the next lowest, around 3/8 of 
1~~. * 
c. Performance Unimpressive 
1. ~ !£! bettered ~ "Averages" 
Criticism of the mutual fund industry is often 
voiced in the form of comparing the performance of the 
mutual funds with the stock market averages and pointing 
out that the mutuala have not bettered these averages. 
The Dow-Jones Industrial Average is moat often used to 
prove this point. 
Mutual funds have, in general, met the aver-
agee, but it is true tr~t they have not bettered them. 
* 24 , PP• 7-100 
77 
As the averages are sometimes taken to indicate the 
market picture over a period of time, the failure of 
the mutual funds to better the averages is taken by 
some to indicate that the investor in "blue chip" secu-
rities could have done as well as the mutuals over the 
same period of time. 
2. Defense 
The mutual funds answer this criticism by 
pointing out that they do not lose ground to the aver-
ages. ~he swall investor, the mutuala point out, loses 
money in the market over a period ~ time--sometimes when 
the averages are rising. '.l:he stock market shakeout of 
19~7-1938, and at the outbreak of World War II, caused 
many small investors to lose. 
By combining the investments of many investors 
and by maintaining diversified portfolios, including 
"blue chips", the investment companies have protected 
the small investor against loss. In doing this, the in-
vestment companies feel that they have performed a useful 
and necessary service for that group of investors who can-
not afford other investment counsel. 
D. Mutual .l!'unds All .fu2! Seasoned 
1. ~ M£1 Weathered ~ business uycle 
In the discussion of safety of principal which 
preceded this section of the thesis, this charge was given 
a rather searching analysis. Some of the statements made 
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at that time are worthy of reiteration. .l!'ourteen of 
the mutual funds--including some of the leaders in the 
field today--were formed prior to the 1929 debacle. 
~hese funds came out of the investigations of the late 
thirties with a clean bill of health. 
2. ..l!'unds 'fested ,& ~ and !J!r 
Many funds, including the fourteen just men-
tioned, were in operation at the bottom of the depression 
when the mistskea and excesses of the period leading up 
to 1929 were still in the public mind. Many funds were 
formed before the downturn in 1937, which saw the Dow-
Jones average fall below 100 to 98.95 on W~rch 31, 1938.* 
The majority of the important funds were in 
operation in 1942, when the Dow-Jones average fell to 
92.92 on April 28, l942.**This point was the lowest since 
the market started its recovery from the <.;rash in 1929. 
The mutual fund industry has been tested by 
a variety of economic conditions which could ha ve been 
the caus e of great trouble to the industry. Hut the 
for ego ing economic changes were met. ·.chese factors test-
ed the sk ill and judgment of the sponsors and managers 
of the funds. •.rhe mutual fund indus try acquired skill 
and seasoning during these past times of stress, and 
their han dling of these past problems gives promise of 
successful handling of similar future problems. 
* 18, P• Al36 
* * 18, P• Al61 
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E. l!'Unds ~ Source .2.f Potential lJanger 
1. tould ~aggerate ~ Downturn 
Among the more nebulous criticisms raised 
against the mutual fund industry, and among the charges 
which are most difficult to counter, are the charges 
that mutual funds represent a potential menace to the 
orderly conduct of the market at times when the prices 
of securities begin to fall. ~ritics say that the pos-
sibility of accelerating this fall is present, consider-
ing the mutual fund's large blocks of securities. If 
the mutuals were to unload these blocks at a time when 
the rr~rket were in the delicate balance, these blocks 
could force a do~nturn. 
ldutual funds are not the only holders of 
large blocks of securities which represent potential 
danger to an orderly rr~rket. Pension funds and insti-
tutional investors, such as the universities, are also 
nolders of potentially dangerous blocks of securities. 
If the time should arise when the funds would 
be faced with sholesale liquidation of mutual fund shares 
by the holders, a problem would be created which would. of 
course, have repercussion throughout the economy. When 
such a demand forced the mutual funds to sell assets to 
get cash with which to pay off fund share holders, the 
effect on the market would be directly proportional to 
the amount of assets the funds would have to sell. 
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A factor which would have to be considered 
in this problem is the original cause of the "run" on 
the funds. Is the cause to be found in the mutual fund 
industry alone? Is a mutual fund in trouble? The ef-
fect of such troubles would not be sufficient to throw 
the entire economy into a downspin unless a great num .. 
ber of funds were in financial difficulties. 
If the cause of the run onthe mutual funds 
was outside the fund industry and in the economy as a 
whole, the effect would be devastating. For along with 
the mutual funds. everyone would be trying to unload se-
curities. Mutual fund mansgements are well aware of this 
potential danger they possess. They could be expected 
to unload large blocks of steaks on a depressed market 
only when forced to do so. They would try every means 
of calming the storm with regard to their shareholders. 
2. Large Voice !a Corporate Affairs 
Another problem which has been raised in the 
minds of some is the problem, a a they see it, of the mu-
tual funds growing more important in corporate affairs. 
The picture of the mutual funds growing into giant hold-
ing companies is one that distnrbs many people. The prob-
mem of size and voice in corporate affairs was one which 
the drafters of the Investment Company Act considered. 
Certain safeguards against too much voting 
power on the part of the mutual funds have been incorpor-
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at ed in the Act. Mutual funds are not allowed to in-
vest over 5% of their assets in any one company. or to 
hold more than 10% of the voting securities of a com-
pany. lv!ost mutual funds do not hold anywhere near 
these maximum figures. 
The drafters of the Investment Company Act 
had. in the beginning. a restriction on the size to which 
a mutual fund could grow. This did not get into the fi-
nal draft of the Act. but a provision is lincorporated 
which would allow t he S. E.C. to investigate any compan-
ies which it thought were getting too big. The Commis-
sion has yet to investigate a company on this charge. 
The mutual funds take their position of im-
portance in corporate affairs quite seriously. They have 
in some instances espoused the cause of the small inv est-
or. whom some mutual funds have come to feel t hey repre-
sent. The mutual funds feel that by taking an active and 
articulate part in corporate meetings. they are following 
t he dictates of their shareholders. Mutuals may take a 
large part in corporate affairs--they are large stockhold-
ers--but they certainly do not wish to take control in 
t hese aff airs. 
F. Additional Information .2!! Mutual Funds 
1, Smal~ Investor Medium 
Wellington b'und. one of the largest Balanced 
Funds. bave 61.000 shareholders. Women own 40% of these 
shares. men 38%. and 22% is held in joint accounts. 
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Individual trustees, insuranceoompanies, pension plans, 
and other institutional investors, to the number of 1809 
institutional holders, are included among its sharehold-
ers.* The average holding in Wellington ~'und amounts to 
approximately ~ 2500. 
Massachusetts Investors Trust, the oldest and 
largest of the mutual funds, has 6004 institutional in-
vestors of a total of 82,523 shareholders.**The average 
inves t ment in this fund is about $4400. 
The average investment in these and other mu-
tual funds ia not a large figure. It ia well within the 
range of a small investor's investment. ]'undamental In-
vestors has an average of $3500. per holder. One of the 
smaller and newer funds, Formus Fund of Boston has an av-
*** 
erage of ~1400. A fund which varies quite a bit from these 
is General Capital Uorporation, which baa an average of 
$11,800 per holder.**** 
The amounts held by non-institutional investors 
must logically be less than the avera ge for the funds, 
since the small number of institutional investors have a 
very large proportionate i nvestment. 
2. Forma £! Organization 
Mutual funds have taken two separate and dis-
tinct forma of organization. The original fund took the 
* 
** 
*** 
**** 
12, 
9 , 
24, 
24, 
P• 9 
P• 11 
PP• 36-38 
p. 4~ 
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"common-law" trust form, the voluntary association. 
Others have taken the corporate form. The greater am 
majority are organized as corporations. Of 101 mutual 
funds reported in the Mutual Fund Directory, 80 were 
corporations and 21 were organized as trusts under va-
rious state laws.* 
In the trust form the title to the securi-
ties is held by the trustees who sell certificates of 
participation in the earnings of this portfolio. The se-
curities held by corporate funds are held by the corpor-
ate entity and purchasers of these mutual fund shares 
participate in the earnings also. In neither case does 
the purchaser of fund shares have a direct share in the 
securities held by the funds. 
Voting rights are incorporated in the shares 
sold by the corporate type funds. Annual meetings and 
elections of directors are provided for. In the "trust 
type" of funds. there is no provision for regular voting 
or meetings. In order to protect holders in this type of 
fund, certain provisions in the Investment Company Act 
all for write-in voting on matters of importance to the 
holders. 
Those funds which have taken the corporate 
form are not limited as to length of life, as they re-
* 24, PP• 9-100 
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ceive what amounts to a perpetual charter. The volun-
tary associat ion has a limit to ita life. Massachusetts 
Investors Trust will continue for twenty-one years after 
the death of the last survivor of the original trustees. 
At the time of the death of the last survivor, 
Massachusetts Investors Trust may be conveyed to other 
trustees. to a corporation, or dissolved. Upon dissolu-
tion. the proceeds would be distributed to the sharehold-
ers.* 
* 10, P• 12 
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CHAPTER V 
Mutual b'unda .As a Source of Equity and Venture Capital 
I. The Post-War Problem of Equity and Venture Capital 
A. Small Problem !£ Larger Corporations 
1. rteinvest Earnipgs 
The rate of new capital formation in the United 
States has been very high during these post-war years. A 
major portion of this capital format ion has been financed 
through reinvested earnings on the part of the larger cor-
porations. The problem of equity and venture capital is 
not one of vital concern among these larger corporate enti-
ties. 
2. §.ili .£! ~ Issues 
Well-established companies have been able to 
do their outside financing through issuing bonds and 
without recourse to the equity capital markets. Interest 
rates have been low and bond financing has been cheap for 
large corporations. 
Insurance companies with peak reserves have 
been purchasing a great portion of these bonds directly 
from the issuer through private placement. Over one-third 
of the corporate bond flotations in the period 1946-1949. 
approximately 37~ or $9.9 billions of a total of ~ 26.6 bil-
lions were privately placed. Insurance companies aqpounted 
for over 90% of these privately placed issues.* 
* 22. P• 36 
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Large corporations resort to private place-
ment for a variety of reasons. ~he most important are: 
the avoidance of costly investigations and registrations 
under the Securities Act of 1933, the elimination of un-
derwriters fees and commissions, and the ease of handling 
the interest payment in a single check instead of many. 
3. Eguity Financipa 
Equity financing has played a smaller part in 
the financing of large corporations over the past few 
years. The trend is illustrated in the following table. 
TABLE IV 
Percentage of Debt and Equity Securities in Corporate 
Capitalization 
Manufacturing Corporations 
Liabilities 
Stockholder Equity 
Trading uorporationa 
1946 
35.7% 
64.3 
37.£% 42.3% 45.~fo 
62.8 57.7 55.0 
Liabilities 
Stockholder Equity 
Source: U'S. Bureau of Internal rtevenue Reports* 
This growing percentage of debt securities in corporate 
capitalization has been decried by many observers. The 
absence of high grade equity issues is one of grave concern. 
B. Grave Problem !£ Smaller ~ Newer uorporations 
1. ~ Capital ~ Growth 
In order to foster the growth of small and me-
dium sized corporations, a steady supply of equity and ven-
* 22, P• 36 
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ture capital is essential. The material goods, which 
are the keystone of the hi~h American standard of living, 
are the product of American ingenuity and productive cap-
acity. Any move which would foster the growth of this 
capacity would tend to foster a higher standard of living. 
New ideas and new products are necessary. We 
have not reached the "millennium" and there are ind icati one 
we will never reach this static point. 
2. ~ Financing M .H'avorable 
The low interest rates which are available to 
larger corporations are not similarly available to small 
corporations. Private placements of small bond issues is 
not t h e rule. •rhese factors which make bond financing at-
tractive to large corporations are not favorable to small 
corporations. 
3. .blgui t y .H'inancing &pensive 
The only avenue open to the small company which 
wishes to finance through the sale of securities is through 
the issue of common stock. This proves to be the most ex-
pensive method of financing, and the issues of these small 
an d new companies do not meet with t he wholehear ted support 
of the investing public. 
c. Proposed Solutions !£ ~ Dilemma 
1. Avenues £! Approach 
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Certain alternatives present themselves for con-
sideration whenever the problem of equity and venture capital 
is broached. '.!!hey include: 
1. Liberalization of the present tax luws to encourage 
more investment among the middle and higher income groups. 
2. Allow the government to enter the field as a supplier 
of venture f unds. 
3. Allow some of the financial institutions to invest 
part of their funds in equity securities rather than in 
debt or preferred issues. 
4. Encourage the mutual funds, through enabling legisla-
tion and other means. to become aiDpplier of equity and 
venture capital.* 
As has already been stated in other parts o:f 
this thesis, it is with this fourth suggestion that we 
shall deal. In selecting this alternative, it is not 
meant to imply that the other plans are without merit. 
With the exception of the plan to allow the government 
to enter the field, the other plans to contain much which 
is meritorious. 
The other plans are worthy of considerable in-
vestigation, worthy of separate papers. It is in the ab-
sence of investigation of any of the plans, that the Gov-
ernment may enter the picture through default. It may be 
that the complete answer lies in a combination of the three 
acceptable plans. In this thesis we will attempt to outline 
the part the mutual fund industry could play. 
Whether the industry would be alone, or whether 
it would be aided by other institutional investors, and 
through liberalized tax laws, the wealth~remains for the 
future to tell. That a combined effort on the part of all 
* 22, p. 33 
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investors, institutional and individual, would bring a 
more equitable solution is not seriously questioned. 
2. Government Froposal ~ ~ Put Forward 
The problem of the small busin essman has been 
given some study by the present Administration with regard 
to financli1g his business. President Truman, in his Econ-
omic neport to the nation at the start of 1950, put forth 
the proposal that new banks to provide capital for new and 
growing enterprises be investigated. 
These banks would be capital banks with author-
ity to make long-term loans, or even to invest in c.ommon 
stocks of busine ss fir ms that need financial help. 'fhese 
banks woulo be set up in the 12 .J!'ederal Reserve Districts 
and the capital would be supplied by the commercial banks 
of the District. 
Other avenues through which institutional invest-
mrs could be encouraged to enter the field as suppliers of 
equity and venture capital would also be investigated.* 
3. Indirect Participation Proposed 
Even if the mutual funds were not to participate 
in any of the pro posed plana a a direct suppliers of venture 
capital, it is felt that they could perform an indirect ser-
vice by relieving funds from other sources. If after care-
ful consideration t he mutual f und industry felt that it could 
not enter the field as a direct supplier--because present 
* 27. p. 11 
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legal restrictions could not be safely removed, or because 
the plans would entail a too drastic revision of mutual 
fund investment policies--the industry could relieve some 
of the pressures which keep other investors out of the 
venture capital market. 
By taking up some of the investment which would 
ordinarily be bought by other institutional investors, the 
mutual funds would relieve those funds for i nvestment by 
other institutional investors in the venture capital field. 
For the individual investor of better-than•average means. 
the mutual fund medium would give a relatively safe invest-
ment covered by adequate diversification and competent man-
agement, the greater portion of the investible funds of this 
group allowing the group to enter the venture capital field 
with a portion of their ~unds. 
After protecting the greater portion of his funds 
in this manner, the investor could then afford the risks 
of venture enterprise with a small portion of his funds. 
II. Present Direct Contribution of the Mutual Fund Industry 
Is Small 
A A. Newest £! Institutional Investment Medium 
1. Banks ~ Insurance uompanies Well-Established 
Mutual funds, although offshoots of the older 
forms of investment companies, have been in existence 
scarcely t wenty-five years. The first mutual fund cele-
brated ita t wenty-fifth anniver sary in 1949. 'l'he principle 
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upon which the mutual funds are founded, that of cooper-
ative investment for small investors, is still new enough 
to be of mystery to the average American. 
The basic principles of savings banks and life 
insurance companies are widely understood and accepted. 
When these industries were young, they tto were not widely 
accepted. Tested by time and by business fluctuations these 
companies stand solidly entrenched in the savings habits 
of the public. 
s 
Since it is from these savings that the invest-
ments of tomorrow will be made, the mutual funds have not 
as yet challenged the banks and insuranne companies as in- · 
vestment media. 
During the years the savings bank and the life 
insurance companies have bcome familiar institutions, and 
with this familiarity has come trust. It is just such 
trust and familiarity toward •hich the mutual funds strive. 
2. ~ Emerging !!:.2!!! Infancx 
The oldest of the mutual investment funds are 
just emerging from their infancy. Among these old firms 
are some of the largest and most respected of the funds. 
But for the majority of the "open-end" companies, this 
period has yet to pass. The mutual fund industry is still 
an infant industry. 
The older firms have weathered an eventful 
quarter century, which has proved full of recurring ob-
stacles to their continuing fight for survival. _ Compressed 
into this short period, the mutual fund industry has faced 
unprecedented boom and speculation, a cataclysmic crash to 
the lowest economic depths, searching investigation into 
all phases of the financial economy, and finally war. 
In any one of these phases of its history, a 
new and struggling industry, such as the mutual fund in-
dustry, might well have been crushed, as were many compan-
ies, especially during the dark days of the Thirties. That 
the wutual funds survived is both a tribute to their early 
managers and founders and to their basic premise which was 
not allowed to be sidetracked during the intervening econ-
omic upheavals. 
The mutual fund industry has been guided success-
fully through some trying times. Their growth during this 
period has been remarkable, but their greatest growth still 
lies ahead--in the future. 
3. 1i id~-Income Groups !Q! Entirely ~ .Q£ ~ lli!_ 
With all the remarkable growth of the mutual fund 
idea, especially in the last decade, the industry has not as 
yet begun to approach widespread acceptance among middle~in 
come groups. Banks and life insurance companies remain pre-
eminent in the esteem of this large group. 
The president of the Mutual .l:!'und Institute has 
this to say about his industry 1 a relative importance: 
Since 1940 assets of mutual funds have tripled. 
Stated this way, recent growth sounds phenomenal. 
But actually, the portion of the national savir~s 
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which we have absorbed has been very small. 'l'he 
tripling of our assets since 1940 represented an 
actual increase of only a billion dollars. During 
the same period life insurance companies added ~ 23 
billion to their net reserves; savings deposits 
rose ; 28 billions. This in the face of the fact 
that in the same period of time the puxchasing pow-
er of the life insurance and savings bank dollars 
declined 41~ while the value of stocks rose between 
40 and 507b, and the incon:.e on stocks increased 65'j'o. * 
If the mutual funds are to continue to grow at 
their present rate, this growth will be the result of more 
widespread acceptance of the mutual fund idea among the 
middle-income population. It remains for the mutual fund 
industry to sell itself to an ever-increas ing segment of 
this group which is the largest remaining source of invest-
ible funds as yet untapped. The tapping of this source 
will ultimately lead to the economic gain of the investor 
and, what is more important, to the economic gain of the 
nation. 
B. Mutual .l!'und a could .!jecome More Important in .J!'uture 
1. Depends ~ Continued ~rowth 
Should the mutual funds continue to grow at their 
present rate, it would not be too far in the future before 
the industry would assume a position of importance rival-
ling the present position of savings banks and life insur-
ance compa~ies. Although their present importance is begin-
ning to be acknowledged, the future should see this position 
greatly enhanced. 
"' 1 6 . P• 29 
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~he task of push ing this growth forward at its 
present high rate is not an easy one. 'fhe group from 
which this growth must logically come is not. asaurveys 
have shown. familiar with or trustful of common stock in-
vestments. 
The debgie of 1929 is still in the minds of many 
people. uommon stocks still retain the stigma of being a 
"gamble. n The middle-income group represents the more con-
servative element of the population. ~his group does not 
tak e to a ngamble. n The selling task facing the mutual funds 
is t wo -fold. 'l'he funds must first and foremost sell the 
mutual fund idea. But the other task of educating the pup-
lie in the positive features of common stock investments re-
ma i ns diff icult. 
As one writer has so aptly put it. the public 
wants the "millennium"--absolute s afety. 'l'his does not 
exist. ·.rhe f unds must explain this to the public. but they 
must also emphasize the more positive features of common 
stock investment. If private enterprise is to survive, 
equity capital must be furnished by small investors.* 
2 . :bliutuals Must Voluntarily .Assume ~ ~ 
To become a major supplier of equit;,y· and ven-
ture capital. the fund industry must accept this as part 
of their duty to the capitalistic system. ·.rheir failure to 
* 16. PP• 29-30 
assume t his role in the past has been the source of much 
criticism.* 
The investigations and decisions necessary be-
fore attempting investment in venture enterprise is nec-
essarily more thorough and painstaking tr.l8n that necessary 
before investment in listed securities. 
On the one hand we have the past experience of 
securities in listed companies to guide us; on the other 
we have no such guide and the selection entails more ec-
onomic prediction. ~he effort expended in the latter sit-
uation will be form-idable. .No amount of public or govern-
menta l pressure can be brought to bear on the mutual fund 
i n dustry to make it essay this role. 
'fhe task, however, remains one which must nec-
essarily be undertaken. If it is to be performed well, 
it must be performed voluntarily. The economic good which 
could come from a systematized attempt at solving the ven-
ture capital problem is too great to be undertak en under 
duress. 
3 . rtole vital 1£ ~ ~conomy 
The reasoning behind the average investors re-
luctance--in fact, refusal--to invest in venture enterprise 
is, from this investor•s viewpoint, logical and irre~utable. 
~ealizing full well t he neces s ity of such venture enterprise 
to a growing economy , the small investor is nonetheless 
* 14 ' pp. 29-30 
96 
averse to placing h is funds in tl riskyu enterprise. 
'l'he avera ge small investor, acting in an in-
dividual capacity , would be a poor judge of venture enter-
prise investment. ·.~.:he post-war r ecord of new companies 
which caught t he public fancy is clouded by the perform-
ance of such ventures as the Tucker authmobile and the 
Lustron h ouse. 
Standing apart from t he emotional and gilded 
presenta tions of glib pro mo ters the inv est ment company 
could bring cold and impartial analysis to bear on the 
possibilities present among the many ideas which come for-
ward every year. 
Inv estment company managers and inv estment ad-
visors have had long experience in analyzing cor porate 
securiti es. The bringing of this past experience, in 
many and varied corporate lines, into the field of ven-
ture capital would be a tremendous improvement over the 
present hap-hazard system which charact er izes this field. 
In supplying s ome of the venture cap ital needs 
of the nation, the mutuals would be performing a much needed 
economic se:rvice which would benefit their shareholders and 
the public. The assumption of this dynamic and vital role 
in the national economy is within the powers and possibil-
ities of the mutual fund industry. 
III. Flans Advanced 
.A. ~ "Super Fund" 
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1. Owned ~ ~ Industrl 
The proposal has been advanced that a "super 
fund", operating as an industry-owned fund would be one 
method of paving the way for an industry-wide contribu-
tion to the alleviation of the venture capital problem. 
It would be the purpose of this fund to function exclusive-
ly in this field of venture capital. 
The seeker of venture capital would put his 
plan before this "super fund "• After outlining his needs, 
the investment board of the fund would then be able to an-
alyze the request. Through the combined knowledge and ex-
perience of the board in the many and varied phases of cor-
porate fi1~nce. this group could accept or reject the re-
quest of the new company for venture funds. 
2. Percentage ~articipation ~!!! Funds 
To start this super fund the many members of 
the mutual fund industry would be expected to advance a 
certain small percentage of their assets. The maximum 
figure advanced has been 5% of net assets.* For this con-
tribution the individual funds would receive shares in 
the "super fund". 
The entire indus try would take part in the man-
agement of the new fund. The investment board of the new 
fund would be composed of members of the industry serving 
on a rotating basis or semi-permanently. The rotating 
* 14. PP• 29-30 
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basis has the advantage of allowing more of the -:tnd iv-·- - - -· 
idual firms to take an active part in the managerf~i!t o1!;.. _ 
the new fund over a period of time. 
3. Cri tigue 
-· -
,.... ·--... ---...--:· ........... _ 
Any plan advanced for a "super fund" involves 
industry-wide participation--each mutual fund advawing a 
share of the initial capital of the new fund. In placing 
funds in the "venture capital fund". the members of the 
industrs would become more vitally interested in the prob-
lem of new or venture capital. Investment opportunities 
could be sent up to the venture fund from the member funds 
for action by the investment board of the venture fund. 
Individual mutual funds would be brought closer 
to the problema and to the ways and means of solving or 
alleviating it. In this way. the beat brains of the in-
dustry would focus their attention. in part at least, an 
specific problema of new companies seeking financing. 
Rather t.o.an having a small group within the industry at-
tempt a solution, the entire industry would at one time or 
another be working on it. 
The total amount of funds available from the 
mutual fund industry. assuming 100% cooperation. up to the 
limit of 5% of the individual funds' assets. would not be 
large compared with the demand for venture capital. The 
net asset value of the "super fund" would amount to appro::x-
iilla tely $125,000,000. ~his would not solve the venture 
capital needs of the nation. but it would go a long way 
toward solving some of these needs. 
As such a "super fund" grew--as the mutual 
f und industry grew--the contributions it would make in 
the field of venture capital would also grcm. 
The actual mechanics of setting up this fund 
and t h e decision as to its ultimate form--whether it will 
be of the "open-end" or "closed-end" t ype--can be left 
to those selected by the industry to perform t h ese ta&:s.* 
B. Venture Capital Advisory Council 
1. lvutual ~ Institute 
The Mutual Fund Institute was formed but a few 
years ago as an offshoot of the National Association of 
Investment Companies. One of the purposes advanced for 
the formation of the Institute was to find ways whereby 
the mutuals might increase their service to the investor 
public and to the economy as a whole. 
One ~venue of study undertaken with this purpose 
in mi nd ha s been an examination of the Mutuals' place in 
the supply of venture capital. No results of this inves-
tigat ion are as yet available. 
After attempting this broad investigation of 
the general problem. and after analyzing the facts. the 
Institute can be presumed to make suggestions to the in-
dustry. 
* 14 • P• 210 
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One such suggestion might be that the Institute itself. 
or some committee for.med within it. could become the 
clearing ground for the many venture capital undertakings 
which it might wish to investigate. 
2. Advisory !a Nature 
Careful screening. to eliminate the economic-
~lly unfeasible and the obvious failures from the plana 
brought to the attention of the committee; an examination 
of those ventures which pass this first test; and a gath-
ering together of all the information which might be of 
use in making the final decision to invest or not to in-
vest could be the more important of this advisory commit-
tee's tasks. 
The information garnered in this way could then 
be made available to the individual member funds to be 
acted upon as each fund sees fit. Hather than have a set 
percentage of the industry's assets tied up in venture 
capital investments. each member of the indus try would 
have the final say as to its participation in the spec-
ific venture capital opportunities which arose. 
3. uri tigue 
A board. with advisory capacities rather than 
active investment duties with regard to the problem of 
venture capital. would not be effective in ita operations 
unless individual mutual funds were willing to act on the 
advice given. 
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In order to be successful, such a plan would 
first have to be accepted by all the funds in the indus-
try. If but a few of the funds enter into the plan whole-
heartedly. then the plan is doomed to failur&. 
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Such a plan. if entered into by all, or a maj-
ority of the mutual funds. would have certain advantages 
over the "super fund" in t.l:lat the decision to invest an 
individual fund's assets in venture enterprise would rest 
with the funds managers--who are the best judges of wherein 
they should invest. 
The plan of an advisory committee is also more 
flexible than the super plan in that an individual fund 
does not have a certain percenta ge of ita assets tied up 
in a venture fund--sometimes without being wholly invested. 
The decision on investment rests with the managers of an 
individual fu.nd in this second plan. 'fhey have their as-
sets within easy reach. The individual funds could get 
more u.se and return from their assets under the second plan. 
A feature common to both of these plans is the 
centralization of a mechanism through which an increasing 
supply of venture capital might flow into American indus-
try. ~his centralization would bring some order and plan 
to the haphazard workings in the field of venture capital 
supply. .J:!'rom this could come methods for reducing them-
necessary risks of new business financing. In doing this. 
it might prompt a larger segment of the public to enter 
the field. 
Guided by the selections of the mutual fund in-
dustry, the investing public would be leas apt to pick the 
"dogs" among the new enterprises. Some of the ''dogs" of 
the past have taken the general public for a very costly 
rid e. 
c. Mutual .tl'unds Could Take a More Active Part in Those 
Venture Fu~Airead¥ ~stabliSEed 
1. Need !!.Q! ~ Mutual l!'unda 
In attempting a solution of the venture capital 
problem the mutual fund industry should not overlook some 
of the present organizations set up in this field. Along 
with seeking ways in which the mutual funds could present 
a concerted effort, the individual mutual funds could in-
vest in some of the venture capital companies already in 
existence. 
This would be a positive step toward the alle-
viation of today 1 s venture problems. The plana heretofore 
advanced are nothing more than ideas which will have to be 
investigated. It will take some time to get these plana 
translated into action. 
In the meantime the need for venture capital 
exi~ts. Some of the larger funds could investigate the 
possibilities in this field as represented in function-
ing companies which supply some venture capital. 'l'hese 
funds could retire from the outside groups when the mutual 
fund industry .ha s its plan set up and r eady to operate. 
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The experience to be gained by the individu-
al funds could be passed along to the inBustry group. 
-hen the mutual fund inBustry decided to operate in the 
venture capital field, there would be a backlog of 
trained men available from within the industry. 
2. American nesearch ~ Development vornoration 
This company is a nclosed-end" investment com-
pany formed in 1946 for the purpose of supplying venture 
capital to industry. ~his company includes. among its 
advisors, rrembers of the staffs of Harvard Business School 
and Massachus etts Instit ute of ·.t:echnology. 
The orig i na l plan of the company was to raise 
capital from the insuran ce companies and investment com-
panies. Although it was not contemplated that any one in-
vestment company would invest over 5% of its net aesets. 
it was des ired t r.l8 t such companies could acquire more than 
5% of the voting securities in the new company. 
This ran counter to the anti-pyramiding provis-
ions of t h e Investment Company Act, but .American Heaearch 
asked fo r an exce pt io n . It was granted because the Commis-
sion felt that no one investment company would be able to 
exercise control. 
This company is interested in new scientific 
inventions and devices. It made a public offering of 
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~4 ,000,000. in 1949.* Three mutual funds, Massachusetts 
Invest ors Trust, Massa chusetts Investors Second Fund- -
both under the same inve stment management--and Investors 
Mutual are shareholders in this corporation. As of Decem. 
ber 31 , 1949 , Massachusetts Investors Trust held 20,000 
shares representing less than 1% of its net assets . ** 
Massachusetts Investors Second .li'und, at a re-
cent date held 6,000 shares representing 1/2 of 1% of its 
*** 
total assets. Investors Mutual has about 1ro of its assets 
invested in this co r poration, 9050 shares . **** 
In this regard the ~rustees of Massachusetts 
Investors Trust ha d this to say in 1946 . 
During September, 1946 ••• Maasachusetts Investors 
Trustees placed a small fraction of 1% of its as-
sets in the shares of American Research and Devel-
opment uorporation ••• This was one of the soundest 
media yet dev i sed because its funds were to be di-
versified over a number of separate venture situa-
tions •••• "The war vastly accelerated the pace at 
which new processes, mechanisms , and materials af-
fected industria l techniques. A certain amount of 
development capital is required to exploit such new 
dev elopments. Your Truetees believe that it is good 
po licy to invest. within definite and rather modest 
limitations, capital funds in the field ••• "***** 
The contributions of the mutual fund inoustry 
to the field of venture capital has indeed been modest . 
A 1% participation by the entire industry would give en-
ough capital to start three or more s uch companies as 
* 29, pp. 152-153 
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**** 25 , P• 1556 
***** 11. P• 39 
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American ~esearch. 
3. uritigue 
The experience to be gai ned in active parti-
cipation wo uld be invaluable when at a later date the 
mutual f unds mi ght start their own venture capital cor-
por ation. 
The investment committee of American Research 
and Development Corpora tion is breaking the ground for 
t he mutual funds to follow. Among its inv e stm~nts are 
i ncluded such venture enterprises with an "atomic age" 
product euch as Tracerlab, Inc., Ultrasonic Corporation, 
High Volrage ~gineerir~ . and Jet Heet, Inc. One of its 
ill-starred investments was in Island Packers, an attempt 
to start a fishing export industry in the South Seas. It 
would be rat her unrealistic for the mutual fund industry 
to refus e to take part--if only to learn the techniques; 
if only to profit from the mistakes of this corpora tion. 
Companies such as American Research and Devel-
opllient uorpora tion are small compared to the size of the 
firm necessary to meet the problem.--~he total effort which 
must later be expended. ~hese small operations cannot re-
place t he larger effort of t he mutual funds to find a solu-
tion. .but until t he mutual funds are able to come up with 
their solution, some of these mutual funds should be invest-
ing in the venture ca pita 1 companies. 
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D. Other Suggestions 
1. Regional Funds ~ Hegional venture Capital Needs 
Regional funds are, by the nature of their own 
self-imposed limits, to a certain geographical area, ex-
pected to be managed by people familiar with that area 
and its possibilities. They are few in number; the one 
which comes to mind as a true regional fund is the 'r e:xas 
Fund. 
This fund is limited to investment in the 
Southwestern part of the United States. The managers 
of this fund believe this to be an area of great natur-
al resources and of marked growth characteristics.* 
If the management of a regional fund is well 
versed in the needs and potentialities of that area, it 
could well serve to supply some of the more localized 
venture capit al needs. A criticism leveled at regional 
funds is that they lack sufficient diversification. Where 
these funds may well exhibit diversification in the indus-
tries represented in its portfolios, it cannot show suf-
ficient georgraphical diversification to satisfy critics. 
As a solution to the large problem of venture 
capital, the r egional fund could contribute but a small 
effort. '.!:he regional fund would rank far behind the plana 
put forward in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
* 24, P• 91 
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2. Industr¥ Funds ~ Venture Industries. 
Industry funds are available for a large num-
ber of industries. There are automobile, aircraft, tele-
vision and natural gas funds. The investment of most of 
these funds is in the seasoned securities of an industry. 
As suppliers of venture capital, they would rank very low. 
Some part of funds in such growing industries 
as the natural gas and pipeline companies must be consid-
ered as venture capital. Gas Industries l!'und, Inc. • em-
phasizes investment in the equities of natural gas com-
panies, and in so doing may be considered to be supplying 
venture capital because of the newness of the enterprises. 
Gas Industries l!'und. Inc •• was formed in middle 
1949, and as of December ~1. 1950, it has a net asset val-
ue of 11 million dollars and ha s paid dividends in 1949 
and 1950.* This is a reasonably successful fund, and it 
ha s taken hold in that portion of the populace who were 
waiting for such a fund. The publicity surrounding nat-
ural gas developments has been great. It was a widely 
publicized industry, and the fund had little difficulty 
in interesting a large segment of the public. 
3. uooperat ive l!:ffort .Amore lli Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors. banks and insurance 
companies as well as mutual funds, are as previously cited 
* 24. P• 40 
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the medium through which a great part of the funds of 
the middle-income group find their way into investments. 
~he trend of other institutional investors 
toward investment in the mutual funds is increasing. 'l'he 
summary of institutional holdings in the Wellington ~'und 
was presented in a previous chapter. '.the latest statis-
tics available from the management of the l!:aton and Howard 
Funds seems to bear out this trend. 
The management of the ~aton and Howard funds 
report sizable sales in blocks of over w25,000 during 
the past year. The average sale in these blocks came 
close to $45.000. This is taken as an indication of 
increasing acceptance of these funds among the institu-
tional investors.* 
An increase in the use of mutual funds as an 
investment medium by banks and insurance companies would 
tend to accelerate the growth of the mutual fund industry. 
Insurance companies and banks, are by their very nature, 
precluded from taking an active part in the supplying of 
venture capital funds. Their contribution must be indi-
rect for the greater part. The mutual funds could well 
serve as the medium through which other institutional in-
vestors might play their indirect, but nonetheless vital. 
part in coming to a working solution of the venture capi-
tal problem. 
* 28. P• 10 
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A rather important factor to be considered 
in bri~ng this chapter to a close is tr~t part which 
t~e Securities and ~change uommission would necessar-
ily have to play because of its ~atchdog" position in 
the mutual f und field. It goes without saying that the 
cooperation and assistance of the uommission will be 
necessary to the furt hering of any mutual fund plana. 
It will be a new field for all concerned. It is to be 
expected t ha t certain past regulations will have to be 
reappraised and reinterpreted,in the light of experience 
in the venture capita l fi eld, as new problems arise. 
llO 
CHAPTER VI 
Summary and Conclusions 
I. Mutual .l!'unds ::$hould Investigate Problem 
.A. Mutuals A Lasting Investment Medium 
1. Not ! ~ Phenomenon 
It has been the intent, in this paper, to 
prove first that the mutual funds are not a boom-time 
phenomenon, and secondly that these mutual funds are 
capable of taking an active part and a vital place in 
the economy as a supplier of venture capital. 
Mutual funds are looked upon, some quarters 
of the financial world feel, as a phenomenon of the 
boom times of the past few years. The proponents of 
' ,, 
this idea would have us believe that the mutual funds 
would collapse at the first sign of economic distress. 
Not every fund would be expected to collapse. but the 
industry would in the majority be out of business in a 
short time after a major depression began. 
Some of the older funds would be expected to 
survive, but at the price of a drastic downward revision 
in portfolio valuations and at the price of enormous 
prestige and investor trust. 
When the business cycle had run its course 
tr~ough a depression, and at a time when revival was 
well on its way. these dormant funds would be revived 
and grow till the circle was again repeated. 
lll 
~his is a rather dismal and disheartening 
picture to paint of an industry which is at the present 
time riding a wave of popularity. It is not the intent 
of this thesis to enter the realm of financial prognos-
tication--or to prophesy the exact future st atus of the 
mutual f und indus try. 
~he mutual funds, along with most segments of 
American business, are not depression proof. A severe 
recession or depression would certainly lea d to a downward 
revision in portfolio valuation. '.!.'hat the downward revis-
ion would lead to an abandonment of the mutual fund idea 
is to be seriously doubted. 
2. .l!·ollow Accewted Investment Principles 
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Indications are everywhere present in the mutual 
fund industry that principles far removed from t hose which 
characterized the boom period of the late 'l'wenties are be-
i~~ followed by the industry. The mutual f und industry was 
very small in t he ~wenties, but some of the present funds 
weathered that dra stic economic upheaval. 
Those funds which survived 1929 were the models 
for the many funds founded in the i nt~ening years. A great 
many of the present mutual funds have survived depression. 
recession, or war--some have survived all. ·..t.:he experience 
of t he funds dur i ng tr ... ose tr ~ ing periods give rise to the 
hope t l~t the industry is following a course which is far 
from speculative or unsafe. 
3. Investor ~iven Measure of Protection 
-
We can find some protection in the provisions 
of the Investm.e.rit Company Act of 1940, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission is keeping tile "open-end" funds 
under close surveillance. 'fhese facts give us reason to 
believe t nat the excesses and abuses wh ich were character-
istic of l92S will not again become pr evalent. 
The long inv estigations of the Thirties were 
focused on those practices which wer e widely felt to have 
been contributory to the severity of the depression. As 
a result some legislation was pas sed which was designed to 
put an end to t hese practices. The Investment Company Act 
is one example of this legislation. It is designed to pro-
teet the investor in mutual and other investn1ent funds. 
Whether this legislation baa hit at the roots 
of the problem or not is a discussion beyond the scope of 
this paper. The point to be drawn from these few words is 
that the investor has been given much more protection than 
heretofore--mutual fund investors included. The investor 
is protected against specific abuses; whether ot not he ie 
ll~ 
protected against depression remains for the future to prove. 
B. Mutuals Could Help la Finding Solution 
1. Would Cut Down on Some Criticism ~=------
The second factor considered in this paper is 
t nat the mutual funds' place in the supplying of new capi-
tal for American business. How soon these fund s will be 
able to enter this field remains to be seen. The indus-
try must decide on the plan. .A t t.ne present time some of 
the attention of the Mutual Fund Institute is directed 
toward this problem. 
It has been our attempt to keep away from the 
shibboleth of "economic justification" for the continuing 
existence of the mutual funds. But it is difficult to 
ignore this factor completely since many critics of the 
mutual funds have claimed that the funds perform no serv-
ice which is not a duplication of services performed by 
other organizations or groups . 
The positive approa ch to a solution of the ven-
ture capital problem would do much to cut down that portion 
of the criticism, directed against the mutual funds, which 
stems from the factor of proving "economic justification." 
A 5% contribution from each of the mutual funds 
would amount to roughly 125 million dollars. Placing these 
funds in the venture capital market would be a hundred-fold 
improvement over the present venture capital set-up. This 
contribution from the funds to the national economy wou ld 
be a small sacrifice for the funds to make, but the positive 
~esults of such a step would be invaluable to the nation. 
I 
I It has not been tne purpose of this paper to 
pick out one certain, specific solution or plan to be used 
in the venture capital field by the mutual fund industry. 
I have attempted to focus attention on some avanues of 
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approa ch to be followed in attempting a solution. 
2. Final Answer Remains 1£ ~ Found 
I do not presume that the final answer is 
with in t h e pages of this paper. This is but one man's op-
inion. If more men would focus their attention on the prob-
lem, I do not doubt but that a solution would be forthcom-
ing. 
In analyzing a problem such as that of venture 
capita l. t h ere is always the chance that the answer will 
not be forthcoming before the economic laws force their 
own solution or diminish the magnitude of the problem. 
The problem of venture capital supply may diminish for a 
time, but at a later date it is sure to come forward again • 
.Any workable plans brought forward by the mutual 
funds may not be forthcoming in time to be of use in the 
illllllediate future, but the far future holds many recurrences 
of this venture capital shortage. The mutuals shoUli be 
ready. 
3 . Mutllals Should ~ Heady !Q!. ~'uture 
The mutual fllnds should be ready because these 
funds have been gaining acceptance among the middle-income 
groups, and it is from this group as stated before that 
the venture capital supply of the future must be forthcom-
ing. 
The mlltual funds should be ready because in the 
wide diversification practiced by these funds, t here is an 
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extra measuxe of protection afforded the investor. The 
small percentage of the total funds which the mutuala 
could make available to the venture capital field would 
be protected in a great degree by the diversification 
~racticed with their remaining funds. 
Diversification which acts to protect the 
investors in present mutual funds would also act to pro-
tect that portion of the mutual fund assets invested in 
venture enterprise in the future. 
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